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 Companies are increasingly relying on highly paid corporate general counsels 
(GCs) to help manage the risks of costly regulatory sanctions and shareholder lawsuits 
associated with their firms’ accounting and overall business practices.  While recent 
research documents the role of the GC on specific decisions in isolation, whether and 
how GCs fulfill their intended role of managing their firms’ expected legal costs remains 
an open question.  I document several ways in which GCs affect the expected legal costs 
associated with their firms’ accounting choices.   
The analysis is based on the insight that the expected legal costs associated with 
the firm’s accounting choices depend on three factors: (1) the extent to which the firm 
undertakes legally risky accounting practices, (2) the likelihood that such practices are 
detected by outsiders, and (3) the severity of penalties outsiders impose on the firm upon 
detection.  Managers can affect the first factor by taking the external legal environment as 
given and altering their internal decisions accordingly, whereas managers can affect the 
latter two factors by altering the firm’s external legal environment through their influence 
on the intensity of outside monitoring and enforcement.  I provide evidence that the GC 
decreases the firm’s expected legal costs via all three factors. 
 
First, firms with an influential GC (GC firms) display a preference for real 
earnings management relative to accrual earnings management and GC firms accelerate 
the recognition of losses in earnings, both of which entail less legal risk.  Second, firms 
that make aggressive accounting choices are less likely to be targeted by SEC 
enforcement actions in the presence of an influential GC.  This finding indicates that GCs 
are able to advise their firms about how to use accounting discretion in a way that avoids 
unwanted regulatory scrutiny.  Third, GC firms are less likely to be sued following a 
restatement announcement.  When their firms are sued, the lawsuits are more likely to be 
dismissed and the settlement amounts are lower.  These findings indicate that the GC’s 
advocacy is associated with a reduction in the severity of penalties outsiders impose on 
the firm when improper accounting choices are discovered. 
The analyses culminate with an examination of the GC’s effect on the firm’s 
overall corporate risk and the market’s assessment of the GC’s contribution to the firm.  I 
find that GC firms are associated with lower corporate risk as measured by the volatility 
of future stock returns and lower levels of future risky investments in the form of capital 
expenditures and research and development expenditures.  Finally, the market responds 
favorably in years that firms appoint a GC to the top management team, consistent with 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 Firms face the risk of costly regulatory sanctions or shareholder lawsuits as a 
result of their accounting and overall business practices (Dechow et al., 1995; Beneish, 
1999; DuCharme et al., 2004; Jones et al., 2008; Kim and Skinner, 2012).  In an effort to 
manage this risk, companies are increasingly including corporate general counsels as 
members of the top management team and paying them substantial compensation 
(Duggin, 2006).  Recent research examines the general counsel’s influence on individual 
firm decisions, but the manner and extent to which corporate general counsels fulfill their 
intended role of lowering their firms’ legal risk remains unclear.  Insight into this issue is 
necessary to evaluate whether firms’ increasing reliance on and investment in the general 
counsel is justified.  Accordingly, this study examines the general counsel’s effect on the 
various channels that collectively contribute to the legal risk associated with the firm’s 
accounting choices. 
 The analysis is based on the insight that the firm’s expected legal costs depend on 
the following three factors: (1) the extent to which the firm undertakes legally risky 
activities, (2) the likelihood that such activities are detected by outsiders, and (3) the 
severity of penalties outsiders impose on the firm upon detection.  Managers can affect 
the expected legal costs from the first factor by taking the external legal environment as 
given and altering their internal decisions accordingly.  Managers can also affect the 
expected legal costs from the latter two factors by altering the firm’s external legal 
environment through their influence on the intensity of outside monitoring and 
enforcement.  Whereas prior literature solely focuses on the first channel, I study the 
general counsel’s (GC) effect on all three channels.   
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The potential for GCs to affect each of these factors arises from the various roles 
they play in an organization.  Specifically, GCs can serve as business advisors, legal 
advisors, and as agents in the firm’s dealings with outside parties (Nelson and Nielson, 
2000; DeMott, 2005).  In their role as business advisors, GCs may influence the extent to 
which firms undertake legally risky activities, consistent with the argument that GCs 
contribute to strategic and operational decisions in a similar manner to other members of 
the executive team (Nelson and Nielson, 2000; DeMott, 2005).  For example, Heineman 
(2010) argues that as a business advisor “The General Counsel should be at the table with 
the CEO on the broad array of performance issues: key operational initiatives, economic 
risk assessment and mitigation, major transactions, new strategic directions…and major 
accounting decisions” (Heineman, 2010, pg. 8) (emphasis added).  In their role as legal 
advisors, GCs may influence the likelihood that legally risky activities are detected by 
using their legal and business expertise to structure transactions in a way that passes legal 
muster.  Finally, as an agent in the firm’s dealings with third parties, the GC may affect 
the severity of legal penalties the firm faces through the effectiveness of her advocacy. 
 I study each of these possibilities using a sample that consists of 36,220 firm-year 
observations and 3,395 unique firms over the period 1992-2013, obtained from 
Compustat’s Execucomp database.  Similar to other studies (Kwak et al., 2012; Goh et al., 
2014; Hopkins et al., 2015), I identify firms with an influential GC (GC firms) as those in 
which the GC is among the top five highest paid executives in the respective firm-year. 
 I begin with an examination of the GC’s impact on the riskiness of the firm’s 
accounting practices.  I first test the association between the presence of a GC on the top 
management team and the firm’s earnings management practices.  While Hopkins et al. 
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(2015) find that GC firms use greater accruals management, firms can also reach 
financial reporting goals by altering operational activities to influence reported earnings.  
Because GCs’ judgments may extend to operational decisions in their role as business 
advisors (Heineman, 2010), I expand upon Hopkins et al.’s (2015) finding by considering 
whether GC firms also differ in the extent to which they rely on real earnings 
management.   
I then examine whether GC firms are associated with the documented tradeoff 
between real and accrual-based earnings management (Cohen et al., 2008; Badertscher, 
2011; Zang, 2012) based on the different legal risks associated with the two forms of 
earnings management.  Specifically, accrual-based earnings management is subject to 
greater legal scrutiny because accounting choices can be evaluated against U.S. GAAP 
(Graham et al., 2005; Cohen et al., 2008; Zang, 2012).  By contrast, there is a more 
tenuous basis for regulators to evaluate the propriety of operating decisions that result in 
real earnings management.  Given these differences, GCs may prefer real relative to 
accrual earnings management tactics.  I find that GC firms are associated with higher 
levels of real earnings management and that GC firms display a relative preference for 
real relative to accrual earnings management.  This finding is consistent with GCs 
encouraging firms to use a less legally risky form of earnings management to reach their 
financial reporting goals. 
  Given that litigation risk is a key source of demand for accounting conservatism 
(Watts, 2003), I also examine the GC’s effect on legal risk via the asymmetric timeliness 
of earnings.  I find that GC firms accelerate the recognition of bad news, suggesting that 
GCs reduce the firm’s legal risk by promoting the timely recognition of losses.  These 
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findings suggest that GCs encourage less legally risky accounting practices and provide 
an interesting perspective on Hopkins et al.’s (2015) finding of greater discretionary 
accruals for GC firms.  While GC firms are associated with a greater use of discretion, 
my results suggest that GCs encourage their firms to be prudent in their use of this 
discretion. 
 To examine the GC’s impact on the likelihood that regulators detect the firm’s 
risky accounting activities, I test whether GCs affect the extent to which earnings 
management results in SEC enforcement actions.  I find that firms that make aggressive 
earnings management choices are less likely to be targeted by SEC enforcement actions 
in the presence of an influential GC.  This finding indicates that GCs are able to advise 
firms about how to use discretion in a way that avoids unwanted regulatory scrutiny and 
supports the notion that the GC reduces the firm’s detection risk. 
 I study the GC’s effect on the severity of penalties from detection by examining 
whether the firm is targeted by a class action lawsuit following a financial restatement.  I 
find that GC firms are less likely to be sued following a restatement announcement.  
Further, when the firm is sued following a restatement announcement, the lawsuits are 
more likely to be dismissed and the settlement amounts are lower in the presence of an 
influential GC.  This evidence suggests that the GC is able to effectively advocate on 
behalf of the firm when aggressive accounting choices are detected. 
 Having established the GC’s effect on the firm’s legal risk with respect to its 
accounting practices, my analyses culminate with an examination of the GC’s effect on 
the firm’s overall corporate risk and the market’s assessment of the GC’s contribution to 
the firm.  I first examine the GC’s association with overall corporate risk, as reflected in 
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the volatility of firm performance.  Because sharp stock price declines are often 
precursors to litigation, volatile firms are more susceptible to litigation (Kim and Skinner, 
2012).  I find that GC firms are associated with lower corporate risk as measured by the 
volatility of stock returns.  I also find that GC firms are associated with lower future risky 
investments in the form of capital expenditures and research and development 
expenditures.  Finally, I test the market’s assessment of the GC’s contribution to the firm 
and find that the market responds favorably in years where the firm appoints a GC to the 
top management team.  This finding is consistent with the market perceiving the GC’s 
activities to enhance firm value by lowering the expected costs associated with regulatory 
scrutiny or shareholder litigation. 
 This study contributes to the literature in several ways.  First, I demonstrate that 
GCs have a positive net effect on firm value, an insight that cannot be obtained from 
prior studies that examine the GC’s effect on individual firm policies in isolation.  
Second, I provide evidence on the three channels by which GCs enhance firm value.  
Specifically, I demonstrate that GCs reduce the firm’s expected legal costs through their 
influence on: (1) the firm’s tendency to undertake legally risky accounting practices, (2) 
the likelihood that legally risky accounting practices are detected by outsiders, and (3) the 
severity of penalties outsiders impose on the firm upon detection.  Prior studies have 
primarily studied the GC’s effect on internal firm policies, while taking the external legal 
environment as given (Kwak et al., 2012; Goh et al., 2014; Hopkins et al., 2015).  I 
expand upon this analysis and provide new evidence that an influential GC can impact 
the firm’s external legal environment through her influence on the intensity of outside 
monitoring and enforcement.  Thus, this study contributes to more complete insight on 
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whether GCs are successful in lowering the legal risk associated with their firms’ 
accounting practices. 
 Third, the evidence I provide extends prior insights on the GC’s role with respect 
to earnings management.  Specifically, my finding that GC firms display a preference for 
real earnings management indicates that GCs encourage a less legally risky form of 
earnings management.  Moreover, the fact that GC firms are associated with greater 
conservatism despite their greater use of discretion in accruals suggests that GCs 
encourage the prudent use of accounting discretion. 
 Finally, the findings that GCs are associated with the extent of real earnings 
management and overall corporate risk extend our understanding of the GC’s role by 
showing that their influence extends to operational decisions.  This confirms that the 
contemporary GC’s role extends beyond that of a narrowly defined legal compliance 
officer. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Chapter 2 reviews the prior 
literature and develops the hypotheses.  Chapter 3 describes the research design.  Chapter 




Chapter 2: Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
2.1 Legal Risk in Accounting Practices 
 Lawmakers and policymakers devote substantial resources to investor protection.  
Because investors rely heavily on published financial statements, ensuring that publicly 
traded companies comply with generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) is a top 
priority.  Companies that utilize overly aggressive accounting choices or are found not to 
comply with U.S. GAAP are subject to a range of potentially negative legal 
consequences.1 For instance, firms with aggressive accruals are more frequently subject 
to SEC enforcement actions and are more likely to be sued (Dechow et al., 1995; Dechow 
et al., 1996).2 Similarly, higher levels of discretionary accruals around seasoned equity 
offerings are associated with a greater likelihood of a subsequent lawsuit and higher 
corresponding settlement amounts (DuCharme et al., 2004).  In response to several 
accounting-related scandals in the early 2000s, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) sharpened 
the legal penalties for fraudulent financial reporting and other forms of corporate 
misconduct by allowing greater avenues for criminal prosecution.3 Meanwhile, lawyers 
                                                
1 A considerable body of research has also linked managers’ disclosure decisions to the firm’s 
legal risk (Francis et al., 1994; Skinner, 1994, 1997; Johnson et al., 2001; Baginski et al., 2002; 
Rogers and Stocken, 2005; Rogers and Van Buskirk, 2009; Rogers et al., 2011). Given this work, 
Kwak et al. (2012) study the relation between the presence of a GC and managerial forecasts. In 
the current study I focus on the firm’s accounting choices rather than the firm’s disclosure 
choices. 
2 SEC enforcement actions relate to investigations into alleged accounting or auditing misconduct. 
Upon conclusion of the investigation the SEC releases an Accounting and Auditing Enforcement 
Release (AAER) summarizing the investigation. 
3 The SEC has charged numerous executives in the post-SOX era. For example, former Riteaid 
CEO Martin Grass was sentenced to eight years in prison and fined $500,000 in 2004, former 
Qwest CEO Joseph Nacchio was sentenced to six years in prison and fined $19 million in 2007, 
and former Cendant CEO Walter Forbes was sentenced to 12 years in prison and fined over $3 
million in 2007 (Sauter et al., 2012). 
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have become more involved in, and responsible for, financial decisions as the boundary 
between accounting and legal duties has increasingly blurred (Schwarcz, 2006). 
The expected legal costs associated with improper accounting practices can be 
economically significant, as reflected in how others price this risk.  For instance, several 
studies document that auditors’ litigation risk from accounting improprieties are 
associated with higher audit fees (Beatty, 1993; Taylor and Simon, 1999; Venkataraman 
et al., 2008).  Further, firms with high litigation risk are more likely to carry directors’ 
and officers’ insurance and to purchase greater coverage (Core, 1997, 2000). 
Given the importance of the legal costs associated with accounting choices, firms 
have significant incentives to reduce or avoid them.  The expected legal costs associated 
with the firm’s accounting choices depend on three channels: (1) the riskiness of the 
firm’s accounting practices, (2) the likelihood that aggressive accounting practices are 
discovered, and (3) the sanctions imposed if these practices are detected.  Thus, firms can 
lower the expected legal costs through any of these channels in isolation or jointly.  
Practically speaking, however, this can be difficult given the complex legal environment 
U.S. firms face.  Therefore, there is a prominent role for legal expertise among the 
executives responsible for the firm’s financial reporting strategy.4 
 
2.2 The Distinct Roles of the General Counsel  
 Demand for corporate general counsels has increased substantially since the 
1970s due to the increasingly complex legal environment faced by U.S. firms, as 
evidenced by the growth in both litigation and the cost of external counsel (Duggin, 
                                                
4 This is consistent with Bagley’s (2008) argument that “legal astuteness” is a valuable capability 
among the top management team that can create competitive advantages for the firm. 
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2006).  As the demand for internal counsel has increased, so too has the supply.  Internal 
counsel positions have become an increasingly attractive career option due to the growth 
in power, prestige, compensation, and career opportunities associated with these positions 
(Duggin, 2006; Heineman, 2012).5 The legal literature documents three primary roles that 
fall within the purview of the contemporary GC: (1) business advisor or entrepreneur, (2) 
legal advisor, and (3) advocate or agent.  I discuss each role in turn. 
Contemporary GCs frequently act as business advisors – a role that has been 
rarely recognized outside of the legal literature.  This literature indicates that the GC 
often plays an entrepreneurial role as a senior executive of the firm while leveraging a 
unique set of skills (Nelson and Nielson, 2000; DeMott, 2005; Heineman, 2010).6 Thus, 
similar to other executives, the GC provides input into strategic and operational decisions.  
This role also involves keeping managers up to date on the relevant laws and anticipating 
how the legal environment will unfold in the future.  For instance, Liggio (1997) argues: 
“Counsel must use his legal foresight to discern trends in the law and to predict how 
those trends will impact the company’s business over time.” (Liggio, 1997, pg. 1208). 
The GC is most frequently recognized as the firm’s resident legal advisor.  The 
accompanying responsibilities include advising executives and the board of directors on 
the firm’s legal compliance and litigation risk.  While the GC often reports to the CEO in 
                                                
5 The role of internal counsel has varied significantly over time.  In the early 1900s GCs played a 
prominent role in the firm, were highly respected, and were highly compensated (Liggio, 2002).  
The GC’s prestige began to subside in the 1940s as companies favored marketing and finance 
backgrounds for internal positions and the use of large external law firms to fulfill the firm’s legal 
expertise (Liggio, 2002).  However, the pendulum began to swing back in favor of internal 
counsel as early as the 1970s (DeMott, 2005; Duggin, 2006). 
6 As one GC describes his role, “I always feel I have one hat, and this is: I am a corporate officer 
who is a lawyer” (Spangler, 1986; DeMott, 2005). 
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this regard, she also serves as the legal advisor to the board of directors (Duggin, 2006).7 
This function may include acting as an internal corporate governance mechanism or 
“gatekeeper” to monitor managers’ unusual or fraudulent behavior (Kwak et al., 2012) 
and has been widely recognized (Coffee, 2003; Hamdani, 2003; Choudhary et al., 2013a, 
2013b).  However, the legal advisory role may also include a “facilitating” function 
wherein GCs use their legal expertise to allow their firms to engage in risky behavior on 
the fringes of legality.  Parker et al. (2009) illustrate this notion: “[L]awyers may play 
games with the law, using their considerable expertise in interpreting and manipulating 
the law to help their clients avoid or evade the effects of the law.  Much of the ‘genius’ of 
corporate lawyering is to contrive ways in which business conduct that defeats the 
purpose of the law can be performed ‘legally’, or at least to create enough ‘wobble’ room 
to make the application of law to corporate activities uncertain.” (Parker et al., 2009, pgs. 
210-211).   
 The GC acts as an advocate or agent in dealings with third parties such as 
regulators, governmental bodies, and outside counsel (Chayes and Chayes, 1985; DeMott, 
2005; Duggin, 2006).  This reflects another familiar “lawyering” role in which the GC 
represents the firm in situations such as litigation and the acquisition of governmental 
approvals.  As depicted by Duggin (2006, pg. 1007): “A general counsel’s advocacy 
function also includes the role of liaison with governmental authorities…Participation of 
counsel is critical in those situations in which government actions may result in 
significant sanctions, especially when criminal proceedings are a risk.”  Therefore, the 
“zealous advocate” role involves casting the firm in the best possible light to outsiders 
                                                
7 Duggin (2006, pg. 1004) states: “The general counsel’s ultimate responsibility, however, is 
always to the client, and the highest authority capable of speaking on behalf of a corporate client 
is ordinarily its board of directors.” 
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without violating laws or compromising ethical standards (Fischel, 1998; Nelson and 
Nielson, 2000; Kim, 2010).8 
It is important to note that the GC’s roles are not mutually exclusive.  A GC may 
assume the different roles at various times depending on the circumstances.  Recent 
research provides mixed evidence on the GC’s role in either promoting or discouraging 
risky financial reporting practices.  Specifically, GC firms are more likely to issue 
management earnings forecasts, and particularly bad news forecasts (Kwak et al., 2012).  
Because increased disclosure (especially with respect to negative news) is commonly 
expected to reduce litigation risk (Skinner, 1994, 1997; Healy and Palepu, 2001; Baginski 
et al., 2002), these results are consistent with the GC encouraging less risky behavior.9 By 
contrast, GC firms use discretionary accruals to a greater extent and are more aggressive 
in their tax planning (Goh et al., 2014; Hopkins et al., 2015).10 Because aggressive 
accounting choices are subject to regulatory scrutiny, these latter results suggest that GCs 
encourage or enable riskier activities.  The contrasting evidence suggests the need for 
more evidence on the role GCs play in their firms’ tendency to undertake risky financial 
reporting activities.   
Moreover, as previously discussed, overall legal risk does not only depend on the 
riskiness of the underlying activities.  It also depends on the likelihood that risky 
                                                
8 Law firm Sullivan and Cromwell states: “An attorney’s principal obligation, both to the client 
and to the public interest, is to be a zealous advocate for his or her client within the bounds of the 
law.” (Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, 2002; Kim, 2010). 
9 Also consistent with GCs reducing firm risk, though not exclusively with respect to financial 
reporting, insiders’ trading profits are restricted when GC approval is required to execute a trade 
(Jagolinzer et al., 2011). Additionally, Armstrong et al. (2010) find that internal monitors’ (i.e. 
general counsel and internal auditors) performance-based incentives are associated with fewer 
adverse firm outcomes. 
10 However, Krishnan et al. (2011) find that legal expertise on the audit committee is associated 
with higher financial reporting quality. 
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activities are detected and the severity of sanctions upon detection.  Thus, more complete 
insight regarding whether GCs fulfill their intended role of lowering their firms’ legal 
exposure requires an analysis of the GC’s impact on all three channels.  I undertake this 
analysis in the current study, focusing on the legal risk associated with firms’ accounting 
practices. 
 
2.3 Hypothesis Development 
As discussed in Section 2.1, there are significant legal implications associated 
with the firm’s accounting choices.  And, as outlined in Section 2.2, the GC’s role in the 
firm has grown substantially due to the increasingly complex legal environment that 
firms now face.  Though studies have begun to examine the GC’s role on the firm’s 
tendency to undertake specific risky activities, it is unclear what their overall impact is on 
the legal risk associated with the firm’s accounting choices.  I argue that the firm’s 
expected legal costs depend on three channels: (1) the riskiness of the firm’s activities, 
(2) the likelihood that these activities are discovered, and (3) the sanctions imposed if 
these activities are detected.  Therefore, the GC can affect the firm’s overall legal 
exposure via their impact on each of these channels. 
As a business advisor whose influence extends to operational decisions and as a 
legal advisor who can either serve as a gatekeeper or facilitator, the GC can affect the 
extent to which firms undertake legally risky accounting practices.  Therefore, I propose 
the first hypothesis (in the alternative form): 
 
H1: The general counsel affects the firm’s legal risk via the riskiness of 
the firm’s accounting practices.   
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In their role as legal advisors, GCs may influence the likelihood that legally risky 
activities are detected by using their legal and business expertise to structure transactions 
in a way that passes legal muster.  Therefore, I propose the second hypothesis (in the 
alternative form): 
 
H2: The general counsel affects the firm’s legal risk via the likelihood 
that aggressive accounting practices are detected by outsiders.   
 
The GC’s role as a zealous advocate suggests she will impact the third channel, 
the severity of sanctions.  Once a risky behavior is revealed, the GC will attempt to 
protect the firm from the associated penalties.  Therefore, I propose the third hypothesis 
(in the alternative form): 
 
H3: The general counsel affects the firm’s legal risk via the severity of 




Chapter 3: Research Design 
3.1 Measuring Legal Risk in Accounting Practices 
3.1.1 Accrual and Real Earnings Management 
 A key financial reporting choice that managers make and that GCs may influence 
is how to use the discretion permitted under U.S. GAAP (Schipper, 1989; Healy and 
Wahlen, 1999).  Accounting standards permit managerial discretion so that managers can 
reveal their private information through their accounting choices, thereby increasing the 
usefulness of the financial reports to stakeholders (Healy and Wahlen, 1999).  However, 
the risk of permitting managerial discretion is that managers may abuse the discretion by 
engaging in accruals management, thereby undermining the usefulness of financial 
reports.  Managers engage in accruals management because of the significant capital 
market incentives to meet earnings expectations.  Specifically, the stock market rewards 
firms that meet performance expectations and penalizes firms that miss expectations 
(Kasznik and McNichols, 2002; Bartov et al., 2002; Lopez and Rees, 2002; Skinner and 
Sloan, 2002; Brown and Caylor, 2005).  In addition, managers’ compensation is 
frequently tied to the firm’s earnings and stock market performance.   
 Managers can also reach financial reporting and performance goals by 
manipulating the firm’s operations.  Roychowdhury (2006) outlines several ways in 
which managers can alter the firm’s operations to meet these goals – namely, sales 
manipulation, the overproduction of inventory, and the reduction of discretionary 
expenses.  Unlike accounting decisions that are subject to auditor and SEC scrutiny 
(Gunny, 2010), the firm’s operating decisions are generally outside the purview of these 
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oversight roles.11 Therefore, real earnings management tactics are less likely to be 
detected and are more difficult to prove in the case of litigation.  Given the weaker legal 
implications associated with real earnings management activities, the GC may have a 
limited role towards affecting these decisions.  However, the GC’s role as a business 
advisor suggests that the scope of the GC’s duties may extend to the firm’s real earnings 
management activities. 
 Though real and accrual earnings management are employed to achieve similar 
outcomes, the enforceability of laws against the abuse of these practices varies 
considerably.  Regarding accruals management, firms must comply with U.S. GAAP and 
the SEC has a clear mandate to monitor firms’ accounting choices for such compliance.12 
With regards to real earnings management, managers owe a fiduciary duty to the firm’s 
shareholders.  The abuse of discretion in how to run the firm’s operations is illegal to the 
extent that it violates the manager’s fiduciary obligations.  However, breaches of 
fiduciary duty are notoriously difficult to prove: “Claims for breach of the duty of care 
generally are subject to the business judgment rule…Simply put, courts will not hear 
complaints challenging management’s business decisions provided that the decisions are 
based on any rational business purpose.” (Casey, 2010, pgs. 20-21) (emphasis added). 
                                                
11 This excludes extreme cases of fraudulent behavior such as channel stuffing. 
12 Former SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt illustrated the SEC’s concern over firms’ earnings 
management activities in a speech given on this topic – “I fear that we are witnessing an erosion 
in the quality of earnings, and therefore, the quality of financial reporting. Managing may be 
giving way to manipulation; Integrity may be losing out to illusion… I am calling for immediate 
and coordinated action: technical rule changes by the regulators and standard setters to improve 
the transparency of financial statements; enhanced oversight of the financial reporting process by 
those entrusted as the shareholders’ guardians; and nothing less than a fundamental cultural 
change on the part of corporate management as well as the whole financial community.” (Levitt, 
1998). The SEC’s efforts to mitigate earnings management continue to more recent years as 
depicted by the development of an “Accounting Quality Model” designed to identify firms that 
are managing earnings aggressively or fraudulently (Lewis, 2012). 
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Therefore, whereas operating decisions can only be evaluated against the broad 
principle of managers’ fiduciary responsibility, inappropriate accruals choices can be 
evaluated against U.S. GAAP.  Moreover, auditors and regulators scrutinize firms’ 
adherence to accounting rules, but these parties do not provide a similar oversight role 
with regards to the firms’ business decisions.  Therefore, the expected legal sanctions 
associated with real and accruals management differs based on the differences in their 
enforceability.13 Consistent with managers structuring earnings management tactics in 
response to legal concerns, firms increased (decreased) their use of real (accrual) earnings 
management tactics after the enactment of SOX (Cohen et al., 2008).  This suggests that 
firms responded to the increased scrutiny placed on the manipulation of accounting 
numbers in the post-SOX period.  Further, managers have indicated they are more likely 
to alter firm operations, with negative long-term consequences, rather than make within 
GAAP accounting choices to manage earnings after SOX (Graham et al., 2005).  Given 
these varying degrees of enforceability, I examine whether the GC affects the firm’s 
preferred earnings management tactic. 
 
3.1.2 Asymmetric Timeliness of Earnings 
Accounting conservatism results from a higher degree of verifiability required to 
recognize gains than losses (Basu, 1997), and is rooted in the notion that managers should 
“anticipate no profits, but anticipate all losses” (Bliss, 1924).  The greater verifiability for 
gains than losses leads to losses being recognized in earnings more quickly than gains.  
                                                
13 Beneish et al. (2012) argue that the threat of litigation affects managers’ earnings management 
choices. However, Laux and Stocken (2012) theoretically illustrate that the threat of litigation can 
increase or decrease managers’ incentives to misreport performance. 
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Watts (2003) argues that the threat of shareholder litigation is a primary determinant of 
conservatism because litigation is more likely to result from overstating rather than 
understating the firm’s net assets.  Accelerating (delaying) the recognition of bad (good) 
news reduces the likelihood that investors can claim damages were incurred, and 
decreases the length of the class period in the event that damages have occurred (Qiang, 
2007).  Therefore, managers can reduce the firm’s expected legal costs by adopting 
conservative accounting practices.  Consistent with this notion, considerable evidence 
suggests that managers respond to litigation concerns with a greater use of accounting 
conservatism (Basu, 1997; Ball et al., 2000; Huijgen and Lubberink, 2005; Qiang, 2007).   
Specifically, Basu (1997) illustrates that firms reported more conservatively 
during periods marked by greater legal liability.  Studying international differences in 
accounting conservatism, Ball et al. (2000) find that, among the common law countries 
analyzed, the U.K. has the lowest expected litigation costs and the U.K. firms report less 
conservatively than the firms in the remaining common law countries.  Expanding upon 
this study, Huijgen and Lubberink (2005) find that U.K. firms that are cross-listed in the 
U.S. report more conservatively than U.K. firms that are not cross-listed in the U.S.  
Collectively, these results support the notion that litigation concerns are a determinant of 
accounting conservatism and that managers respond to legal concerns by adopting more 
conservative accounting practices.14 Therefore, given the role of accounting conservatism 
in mitigating litigation, I also examine the GC’s influence on the firm’s degree of 
accounting conservatism. 
 
                                                
14 Donelson et al. (2012b) also document that the timely recognition of bad earnings news reduces 
the likelihood of litigation. 
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3.2 Empirical Specifications for Hypothesis Tests 
3.2.1 GCs and the Firm’s Accounting Practices (H1) 
 Hypothesis 1 argues that the GC influences the legal risk associated with the 
firm’s accounting practices.  Based on the discussion in sections 3.1.1 and 3.1.2, I 
examine the riskiness of the firm’s accounting practices in three ways.  First, I examine 
the levels of real and accrual earnings management.  Second, due to the varying degree of 
legal risk associated with real and accrual earnings management, I examine GC firms’ 
relative preference between the two forms of earnings management activities.  Third, I 
examine the degree of accounting conservatism exhibited by GC firms.  The following 
model tests the levels of earnings management activities. 
 
EMi,t = β0 + β1(GCi,t) + Σβi(Controls) + εi,t (1) 
 
EM represents the earnings management variable of interest in the respective 
firm-year.  DACC is discretionary accruals, estimated via the cross-sectional modified 
Jones model (Jones, 1991; Dechow et al., 1995).  REM1 and REM2 are aggregate 
measures of real earnings management, estimated as in Roychowdhury (2006).  REM1 is 
the sum of abnormal cash flows and abnormal discretionary expenses.  REM2 is the sum 
of abnormal production costs and abnormal discretionary expenses.1516 All three earnings 
management proxies are increasing in the level of earnings management.  The primary 
                                                
15 I do not form a measure of real earnings management that includes both abnormal cash flows 
and abnormal production costs because activities that lead to abnormally high production costs 
can also lead to abnormally low cash flows, thus confounding the measure (Roychowdhury, 
2006; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010). 
16 The three earnings management proxies are set to missing for firms in financial or regulated 
industries (SIC 6000-6999 and 4900-4999, respectively). 
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variable of interest, GC, is an indicator variable equal to one if the general counsel is 
among the top five paid executives in the respective firm-year, zero otherwise. 
I test the relative preference between the two forms of earnings management by 
restricting the sample to “suspect” firm-years that narrowly meet or beat one of three 
documented earnings targets: (1) zero earnings, (2) zero earnings growth, and (3) the 
consensus analyst forecast (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; Degeorge et al., 1999).17 This 
provides two key advantages.  First, the expected level of earnings management is high, 
thereby increasing the power of the tests.  Second, the earnings management tactics of 
suspect firm-years are more likely to be scrutinized, thus increasing the expected legal 
consequences associated with the firms’ accounting choices in this setting. 
I then conduct three analyses to test GC firms’ preference for real or accrual 
earnings management.  First, I partition the GC and non-GC firm-years into groups of 
positive and negative values of the earnings management proxies and compare the 
frequencies of positive earnings management across the GC and non-GC firms.  This 
analysis highlights the form of earnings management that firms likely used to reach the 
earnings target.  Because the legal risks associated with real earnings management are 
lower than those associated with accruals management, a relative preference for real 
earnings management tactics suggests the firm prefers a less legally risky form of 
earnings management.  Second, I estimate modified versions of equation (1) via binary 
logit specifications.  The dependent variables are indicator variables equal to one if the 
respective earnings management proxy is positive.  Third, I estimate modified versions of 
equation (1) via ordered logit specifications.  I group the firm-years into four buckets 
                                                
17 Narrowly meeting or beating is defined as in DeGeorge et al. (1999): 2*IQR*N-1/3 where IQR 
is the interquartile range and N is the number of observations. 
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based on their propensity to use real or accrual earnings management to reach the 
earnings target, as follows. 
  REMi,t > 0 REMi,t < 0 
DACCi,t > 0 Bucket 3 Bucket 1 
DACCi,t < 0 Bucket 4 Bucket 2 
 
Consistent with the above matrix, REM1_DACC equals one if REM1 is negative 
and DACC is positive, two if REM1 is negative and DACC is negative, three if REM1 is 
positive and DACC is positive, and four if REM1 is positive and DACC is negative.18 
Therefore, higher values of REM1_DACC indicate a relative preference for real earnings 
management relative to accrual earnings management.  REM2_DACC is analogous to 
REM1_DACC using REM2 and DACC. 
 I test the degree of accounting conservatism via the asymmetric timeliness of 
earnings.  This modified version of the Basu (1997) conservatism model is as follows. 
 
ROEi,t = β0 + β1(Di,t) + β2(RETi,t) + β3(Di,t*RETi,t) + β4(GCi,t) + β5(Di,t*GCi,t)  
 + β6(RETi,t*GCi,t) + β7(Di,t*RETi,t*GCi,t) + εi,t (2) 
 
ROE is income before extraordinary items scaled by lagged market value of 
equity.  RET is the market-adjusted cumulative monthly return.  D is an indicator variable 
that equals one if RET is negative, zero otherwise.  All other variables were previously 
defined.  A positive coefficient on the D*RET interaction indicates conservative 
accounting because it suggests negative news is recognized in earnings more quickly than 
                                                
18 Results are similar if the firm-years are grouped into three buckets whereby buckets two and 
three are combined into one bucket or if bucket two is dropped from the analysis. 
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positive news.  A positive coefficient on the D*RET*GC interaction suggests that the GC 
firms report more conservatively than non-GC firms. 
 
3.2.2 GCs and the Firm’s Detection Risk (H2) 
Hypothesis 2 argues that the GC affects legal risk via the likelihood that the firm’s 
aggressive accounting practices are detected by outsiders.  I use AAER enforcement 
actions to capture the detection of the firm’s earnings management practices.  The model 
is as follows. 
 
AAERi,t = β0 + β1(GCi,t) + β2(EMi,t) + β3(GCi,t*EMi,t) + Σβi(Controls) + εi,t (3) 
 
AAER is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm-year is subject to an AAER 
enforcement action, zero otherwise.  All other variables were previously defined.  
Because EM is expected to be positively associated with AAER (for both the real and 
accrual earnings management) a negative coefficient on the GC*EM interaction suggests 
that the GC is able to effectively reduce the detection risk associated with the firm’s 
earnings management activities. 
 
3.2.3 GCs and the Severity of Penalties (H3) 
 Hypothesis 3 argues that the GC influences legal risk by reducing the severity of 
penalties that are imposed if the firm’s aggressive accounting practices are discovered.  
Both SEC enforcement actions and restatements are associated with negative 
consequences (Dechow et al., 2010).  For example, managers and directors experience 
higher turnover following a restatement and are less likely to find a position at another 
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firm (Srinivasan, 2005; Desai et al., 2006; Hennes et al., 2008).  The announcements 
impose significant negative capital market effects (Palmrose et al., 2004; Lev et al., 2008) 
and often result in litigation against the company, the officers, the board of directors, 
and/or the firm’s auditors (Palmrose and Scholz, 2004; Lev et al., 2008).  Given the 
significant costs following a restatement, I study whether firms with an influential GC are 
associated with lower subsequent costs.  The model is as follows. 
 
SUEDi,t = β0 + β1(GCANNi,t) + Σβi(Controls) + εi,t (4) 
 
The sample is restricted to restatement announcements from the Audit Analytics 
database.  I exclude immaterial restatements such as those due to clerical mistakes or 
changes in accounting rules.  I also exclude restatement announcements made in 2012 
and beyond to allow for an appropriate window for penalties to be imposed. 
I hand collect data on class action lawsuit filings and outcomes from Stanford 
Law School’s Securities Class Action Clearinghouse.  SUED is an indicator variable 
equal to one if a class action lawsuit is filed against the company within two years of the 
restatement announcement.  If the firm is sued following a restatement announcement, I 
also examine the corresponding lawsuit outcomes.  Specifically, DISMISS is an indicator 
variable equal to one if the lawsuit is dismissed, zero otherwise.  SETTLEMENT is the 
dollar value of the lawsuit settlement amount in millions.   
GCANN is an indicator variable equal to one if the GC is a member of the top 
management team at the time of the restatement announcement, zero otherwise.  A 
negative coefficient on the GCANN indicator variable suggests that the GC is able to 
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effectively reduce the sanctions resulting from restatement announcements through her 
advocacy, consistent with hypothesis 3. 
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Chapter 4: Empirical Findings 
4.1 Data and Sample Selection 
The sample is comprised of all firm-years covered by Compustat’s Execucomp 
database over the period 1992-2013.  After dropping firm-years for which the GC is not 
identifiable, the sample includes 36,220 firm-year observations corresponding to 3,395 
unique firms.  Similar to prior studies (Kwak et al., 2012; Hopkins et al., 2015) I search 
the annual titles of the available executive-firm-years for the words “counsel”, “law”, 
“legal”, and similar variants to identify executives who are general counsel.19 The GC is 
considered highly paid if she is among the five highest paid executives in terms of total 
compensation in the corresponding firm-year.20 Table 1 Panel A reports the number and 
percentage of firms with a highly paid GC (GC firms) by fiscal year.  The percentage of 
GC firms increases nearly monotonically over the sample period from 18% in 1993 to 
43% in 2013.21 The mean of 29% for the full sample period is comparable to other 
studies (Kwak et al., 2012; Goh et al., 2014; Hopkins et al., 2015).  Table 1 Panel B 
reports the percentage of GC firms by industry, using the Fama-French 48 industry 
classifications (Fama and French, 1997).  The five industries with the lowest percentage 
of GC firms include electronic equipment, retail, banking, fabricated products, and candy 
and soda.  The five industries with the highest percentage of GC firms include utilities, 
                                                
19 I manually review the executives’ titles that are captured by this search and exclude the titles 
that do not refer to legal experts such as tax counsel, investment counsel, etc.  I also manually 
review the job titles that are not captured via the search and code these titles accordingly. 
20 Total compensation is the variable tdc1 from Execucomp. 
21 Although Table 1 Panel A reports on 2% of firms with an influential GC in 1992. The 
inferences remain unchanged if all observations from 1992 are excluded from the sample. 
 25 
entertainment, communication, chemicals, and tobacco products, which is the highest by 
a large margin.22 
Figures 1-3 provide more detailed descriptive analyses of the increasing 
prevalence of influential GCs through the sample period.  Figure 1 is simply a visual 
depiction of the data in Table 1 Panel A.  The increasing prevalence of GCs is nearly 
monotonic, although there appears to be slight jumps over the periods 1999-2001 and 
2008-2010, which would be expected following the dot-com bubble crash and the 
financial crisis.  Figure 2 reports a similar graph by firm size quintile.  Specifically, each 
year firms are sorted into quintiles based on the market value of equity.  The increasing 
trend is comparable across the five size groups, though the jumps over the periods 1999-
2001 and 2008-2010 are more pronounced for the smaller firms.  Figure 3 reports a 
similar graph by industry, using the Fama-French 10 industry classifications.23  There are 
substantial increases in GC prevalence within the utilities, telecommunications, and 
energy industries, whereas the increases are present, but more muted, in industries such 
as consumer products (durables and nondurables) as well as retail. 
The baseline sample of GC firm-years from Execucomp is merged with various 
data sources based on the corresponding test.  The resulting number of firm-years varies 
due to data availability from the respective sources.  Accounting data are from Compustat.  
Stock return data are from CRSP.  AAER data are from the Center for Financial 
Reporting and Management at the University of California, Berkeley (Dechow et al., 
2011).  Restatement data are from Audit Analytics.  Governance data are from Risk 
                                                
22 The inferences remain unchanged if all observations from the tobacco products industry are 
excluded from the sample. 
23 I use the Fama-French 10, rather than 48, industry classifications in Figure 3 for visual ease. 
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Metrics.  Institutional ownership data are from Thomson Reuters.  Litigation data are 
hand-collected from Stanford Law School’s Securities Class Action Clearinghouse.24 
 
4.2 Descriptive Statistics 
 Table 2 Panel A (B) reports the descriptive statistics for the full sample 
(restatement sample).  The final three columns report the variable means for GC firms 
and non-GC firms separately, as well as the p-value testing the equality of means across 
the two groups.  Panel A indicates that GC firms utilize more real and accrual earnings 
management as evidenced by higher values of DACC, REM1, and REM2.  GC firms are 
less likely to experience an AAER enforcement action, but the test of hypothesis 2 
examines whether the relation between earnings management activities and AAER 
outcomes varies between the GC and non-GC firms.  Panel B indicates that GC firms are 
less likely to be targeted by a class action lawsuit following a restatement announcement.  
Further, the class action lawsuits are more likely to be dismissed for GC firms, and the 
settlement amounts are (insignificantly) lower.  Table 3 reports the correlation matrices 
for the full sample (Panel A) and the restatement sample (Panel B). The inferences are 
largely consistent with those obtained from Table 2. 
 
4.3 GCs and the Firm’s Accounting Practices (H1) 
 Hypothesis 1 argues that the GC affects the firm’s legal risk via the riskiness of 
the firm’s accounting practices.  Table 4 reports the results from estimating equation (1), 
which tests the levels of real and accrual earnings management.  Consistent with Hopkins 
                                                
24 http://securities.stanford.edu. 
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et al. (2015), GC firms are associated with greater discretionary accruals, as evidenced by 
the positive and significant coefficient on the GC indicator variable (β=0.008, p<0.01) in 
column 1.  Columns 2 and 3 indicate that the GC’s role extends to the firm’s real earnings 
management practices as evidenced by the positive and significant coefficient on the GC 
indicator variable in both specifications (β=0.017, p<0.01; β=0.025, p<0.05).  
Interestingly, the coefficients on GC are substantially larger in the real earnings 
management specifications as compared to the accruals management specifications.  This 
provides preliminary evidence of a preference for real earnings management, though I 
test this directly in Table 5. 
 Table 5 reports the results on the GC’s relative preference for real or accrual 
earnings management.  The sample is limited to firm-years that narrowly meet or beat 
one of three earnings thresholds: (1) positive earnings, (2) positive earnings growth, and 
(3) the consensus analyst forecast.  Table 5 Panel A reports the percentage of firm-years 
with positive values for each of the three earnings management proxies separately for the 
GC and non-GC firm-years.  Although the results indicate that GC firms use more 
accrual and real earnings management practices, the relative difference is much larger for 
the real earnings management proxies.  Specifically, 71% of the GC firm-years have a 
positive DACC value and 68% of the non-GC firm-years have a positive DACC value.  
The 3% difference is significant at the 10% level.  The corresponding figures for REM1 
are 61% for the GC firm-years and 51% for non-GC firm-years (the 10% difference is 
significant at the 1% level); the corresponding figures for REM2 are 64% for the GC 
firm-years and 56% for non-GC firm-years (the 7% difference is significant at the 1% 
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level).25  Further, the 7% difference-in-difference between REM1 and DACC (10%-3%) 
is significant at the 1% level and the 4% difference-in-difference between REM2 and 
DACC (7%-3%) is significant at the 10% level. 
Table 5 Panel B reports the results from estimating modified versions of equation 
(1).  Columns 1-3 (4-5) report the binary logit (ordered logit) regression results.  The 
insignificant coefficient on the GC indicator variable in column 1 (β=0.068, p>0.10) 
suggests that the GC firms do not use greater accruals management in this setting of 
heightened legal risk.  However, the positive coefficient on the GC indicator variable in 
column 2 (β=0.263, p<0.05) suggests that the GC firms do use greater real earnings 
management in this setting.  Further, the positive coefficient on the GC indicator variable 
in column 4 (β=0.183, p<0.05) suggests a relative preference for real earnings 
management tactics.  The coefficients on GC are also insignificant in columns 3 and 5 
(β=0.167, p>0.10; β=0.085, p>0.10).  Collectively, these results are consistent with GCs 
encouraging the use of real earnings management tactics in favor of accrual earnings 
management tactics to reach earnings targets and thus promoting the use of a less legally 
risky form of earnings management. 
 Table 6 reports the results of the GC’s effect on the asymmetric timeliness of 
earnings (accounting conservatism).  Column 1 reports the baseline Basu (1997) model.  
The significantly positive coefficient on the D*RET interaction (β=0.332, p<0.01) 
confirms that the sample firms report conservatively on average, meaning that losses are 
recognized in earnings more quickly than gains.  Column 2 incorporates the GC indicator 
variable and the corresponding interactions.  The significantly positive coefficient on the 
                                                
25 Though a greater proportion of the total firms appear to use accruals management to reach the 
earnings thresholds, my analysis is concerned with the relative difference between the GC and 
non-GC firms. 
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D*RET*GC interaction (β=0.071, p<0.01) suggests that the GC firms report more 
conservatively than the non-GC firms.  The results are similar in column 3 in which the 
control variables MVE, MTB, LEV, and LITRISK are included along with the 
corresponding interactions.  Specifically, the coefficient on the D*RET*GC interaction is 
positive and significant (β=0.047, p<0.01).  Collectively, the results indicate that the GC 
firms utilize more conservative accounting practices, thereby reducing the legal risk 
associated with the firm’s accounting practices. 
 
4.4 GCs and the Firm’s Detection Risk (H2) 
 Hypothesis 2 argues that the GC affects the firm’s legal risk via the likelihood that 
aggressive accounting practices are detected by outsiders.  Table 7 tests this hypothesis 
by estimating equation (3).  Column 1 reports the main effect of the GC indicator variable 
on AAER outcomes.  The coefficient on the GC indicator variable insignificant (β=-
0.195, p>0.10).  Columns 2-4 test whether the likelihood that the firm’s earnings 
management activities are detected varies between the GC and non-GC firms.  As 
expected, the coefficient on each of the three earnings management proxies is positive 
and significant: DACC (β=2.866, p<0.01), REM1 (β=1.960, p<0.01), and REM2 (β=1.331, 
p<0.01).  Further, the coefficient on each of the three interactions between the respective 
earnings management proxy and the GC indicator variable is negative and significant: 
DACC*GC (β=-5.626, p<0.01), REM1*GC (β=-1.822, p<0.05), and REM2*GC (β=-
1.163, p<0.10).  These results indicate that the earnings management tactics of the GC 
firms are less likely to be scrutinized by the SEC and thus targeted by an AAER 
 30 
investigation.  Collectively, these results suggest that the GC reduces the likelihood that 
risky accounting practices are detected by outsiders. 
 
4.5 GCs and the Severity of Penalties (H3) 
 Hypothesis 3 argues that the GC decreases the firm’s legal risk by reducing the 
severity of penalties imposed when aggressive accounting practices are detected.  I test 
this hypothesis by examining whether the severity of penalties imposed on firms 
following financial restatement announcements varies between the GC and non-GC firms.  
I first examine the announcement period stock returns to confirm that the restatements are 
of similar magnitude across the GC and non-GC firms.  I calculate raw returns, market-
adjusted returns, and abnormal returns over days (-1,+1) surrounding the restatement 
announcement as well as over days (-2,+2) surrounding the restatement announcement.  
RET(-1,+1) and RET(-2,+2) are the firm’s daily compounded returns.  MARET(-1,+1) 
and MARET(-2,+2) are the firm’s daily compounded returns less the market’s daily 
compounded returns over the corresponding time period.  The market return is the CRSP 
value-weighted index.  ABRET(-1,+1) and ABRET(-2,+2) are the firm’s daily abnormal 
compounded returns.  Abnormal returns are calculated as the residual from the market 
model where the firm’s daily returns are regressed on the market’s daily returns over the 
100 days ending 30 days before the restatement announcement.  The market return is 
again the CRSP value-weighted index. 
 Table 8 Panel A reports the announcement periods returns separately for the GC 
and non-GC firms.  As expected, the mean returns are negative for both the GC and non-
GC firms.  Although the GC firms’ announcement period returns are slightly more 
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negative, they are not statistically different in any of the specifications.  This should help 
allay concerns that the restatements are different in terms of magnitude across the GC and 
non-GC firms. 
Table 8 Panel B tests hypothesis 3 by estimating equation (4).  In columns 1-2 the 
dependent variable is SUED, which identifies whether the firm was sued within two years 
of the restatement announcement.  To capture the GC’s effect on the restatement 
outcomes I include GCANN, an indicator variable equal to one if the GC is among the top 
five paid executives at the time of the restatement announcement.  The coefficient on 
GCANN is negative and significant in both specifications (β=-0.619, p<0.01; β=-0.617, 
p<0.01).  This indicates that GC firms are less likely to be sued following a restatement 
announcement.  Column 3 excludes restatements with subsequent lawsuits that are 
pending and the coefficient on GCANN remains negative and significant (β=-0.602, 
p<0.05).  Similar to Donelson et al. (2012a), column 4 (5) includes only restatements 
without a subsequent lawsuit and restatements with a subsequent lawsuit that was 
dismissed (settled).  Interestingly, the coefficient on GCANN is insignificant in column 4 
(β=-0.286, p>0.10), but negative and significant in column 5 (β=-0.884, p<0.01).  This 
result suggests that the GC is able to effectively deter lawsuits following restatement 
announcements, except in the case of frivolous lawsuits. 
Table 8 Panel C examines the outcomes of the lawsuits filed subsequent to the 
restatement announcements in the analyses thus far.  The results indicate that these 
lawsuits are more likely to be dismissed if the GC is a member of top management at the 
time of the restatement announcement.  Specifically, whereas approximately 38% of the 
lawsuits are dismissed for the non-GC firms, over 57% of lawsuits are dismissed for the 
 32 
GC firms.  The nearly 20% difference is significant at the 10% level.  Further, the 
average settlement for the non-GC firms is approximately $119 million, compared to 
approximately $34 million for the GC firms.  Although the $84 million difference is not 
statistically significant, it does appear to be a very economically significant figure.  
Collectively, the results in Table 8 suggest that the GC is able to effectively reduce the 
severity of penalties imposed on the firm following restatement announcements, which 
confirms hypothesis 3. 
 
4.6 Robustness Tests 
4.6.1 Industry Effects 
 A possible concern with the results thus far is that I may be capturing industry 
effects rather than firm effects because there is substantial industry variation in the GC 
measure as reflected in Table 1 Panel B and Figure 3.  Therefore, I first re-estimate each 
of the models after also incorporating industry fixed effects using the Fama-French 48 
industry classifications.  The results are reported in Table 9 and the inferences remain 
unchanged in each of these robustness tests.  Further, the results are frequently stronger 
after controlling for industry effects. 
Table 9 Panel A reports the firm’s earnings management activities.  The 
coefficient on the GC indicator variable is insignificant in the discretionary accrual 
specification (β=0.002, p>0.10), though it remains positive and significant in both of the 
real earnings management specifications (β=0.017, p<0.01; β=0.025, p<0.01).  Table 9 
Panel B reports the firm’s preference for real or accrual earnings management activities.  
The GC firms are not more likely to use accrual earnings management tactics to reach the 
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earnings targets as evidenced by the insignificant coefficient on the GC indicator variable 
in the DACC specification (β=-0.020, p>0.10), though the GC firms are more likely to 
use real earnings management tactics as evidenced by the positive and significant 
coefficient on the GC indicator variable in both the REM1 specification (β=0.312, 
p<0.01) and the REM2 specification (β=0.218, p<0.05).  Further, the coefficient on GC is 
positive and significant in both of the ordered logit specifications (β=0.241, p<0.01; 
β=0.143, p<0.10).  
 Table 9 Panel C reports the asymmetric timeliness of earnings results.  The 
coefficient on the D*MARET*GC interaction is positive and significant when the control 
variables are excluded (β=0.071, p<0.01) and when the control variables are included 
(β=0.051, p<0.01).  Table 9 Panel D reports the detection risk results.  The coefficient on 
the interaction between the earnings management proxy and the GC indicator variable is 
negative and significant in all three specifications: DACC*GC (β=-5.575, p<0.01), 
REM1*GC (β=-1.809, p<0.05), REM2*GC (β=-1.132, p<0.05).  Finally, Table 9 Panel E 
reports the severity of penalties results.  The GC firms are less likely to be sued following 
restatement announcements as evidenced by the negative and significant coefficient on 
the GC indicator when all lawsuits are included (β=-0.602, p<0.05), when pending 
lawsuits are excluded (β=-0.579, p<0.05), and when only settled lawsuits are included 
(β=-0.921, p<0.01).  Similar to the earlier results, the coefficient on the GC indicator 
variable is insignificant when only dismissed lawsuits are included (β=-0.178, p>0.10).  
 Including industry fixed effects in the model captures time invariant variation in 
the dependent variable.  To address variation in the experimental variable, GC, I 
construct a modified version of the variable.  Specifically, I first calculate the industry 
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average of GC by fiscal year.  I then calculate the modified variable, GCINDADJ, as the 
indicator variable GC less the corresponding industry-year average of GC.  I then re-
estimate the primary model specifications after replacing GC with GCINDADJ.26  The 
results are reported in Table 9 and the inferences remain unchanged in each of these 
robustness tests.  Again, the results are frequently stronger after controlling for industry 
effects. 
Table 9 Panel A reports the firm’s earnings management activities.  The 
coefficient on GCINDADJ is insignificant in the discretionary accrual specification 
(β=0.001, p>0.10), though it is positive and significant in both of the real earnings 
management specifications (β=0.018, p<0.01; β=0.027, p<0.01).  Table 9 Panel B reports 
the firm’s preference for real or accrual earnings management activities.  The GC firms 
are not more likely to use accrual earnings management tactics to reach the earnings 
targets as evidenced by the insignificant coefficient on GCINDADJ in the DACC 
specification (β=-0.004, p>0.10), though the GC firms are more likely to use real 
earnings management tactics as evidenced by the positive and significant coefficient on 
the GC indicator variable in both the REM1 specification (β=0.322, p<0.01) and the 
REM2 specification (β=0.238, p<0.05).  Further, the coefficient on GCINDADJ is 
positive and significant in both of the ordered logit specifications (β=0.241, p<0.01; 
β=0.149, p<0.10).  
 Table 9 Panel C reports the asymmetric timeliness of earnings results.  The 
coefficient on the D*MARET*GCINDADJ interaction is positive and significant when the 
                                                
26 I calculate the industry average of GC by year because Figure 3 displays time-series variation 
in GC within industries over the sample period.  Therefore, GCINDADJ captures both the 
variation in GC across industries in each year as well as the variation in GC within the firm’s 
industry over the sample period.  However, the inferences remain unchanged if I use one industry 
average of GC for the full sample period. 
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control variables are excluded (β=0.051, p<0.05) and when the control variables are 
included (β=0.038, p<0.01).  Table 9 Panel D reports the detection risk results.  The 
coefficient on the interaction between the earnings management proxy and GCINDADJ is 
negative and significant in all three specifications: DACC*GCINDADJ (β=-5.716, 
p<0.01), REM1*GCINDADJ (β=-2.056, p<0.01), REM2*GCINDADJ (β=-1.332, p<0.05).  
Finally, Table 9 Panel E reports the severity of penalties results.  The GC firms are less 
likely to be sued following restatement announcements as evidenced by the negative and 
significant coefficient on GCINDADJ when all lawsuits are included (β=-0.594, p<0.05), 
when pending lawsuits are excluded (β=-0.548, p<0.05), and when only settled lawsuits 
are included (β=-0.860, p<0.05).  Similar to the earlier results, the coefficient on 




 Another possible concern is that having a GC on the top management team is a 
choice the firm makes.  Therefore, this self-selection problem may lead to biased results.  
To address this concern, I employ a propensity matching procedure that addresses the 
selection bias due to observable firm characteristics (Tucker, 2010).  Specifically, I 
estimate a binary logit specification to model the firm’s decision to have a GC on the top 
management team.  I then use this model to create a propensity score that captures the 
likelihood of having a GC on the top management team.  Finally, within each test, I 
match each GC firm observation to a non-GC firm observation in the same year with the 
closest propensity score.  The resulting sample includes firms with similar propensities to 
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have a GC on the top management team, except for the feature that the treatment firms 
(i.e. GC firms) did have a GC on the top management team whereas the control firms (i.e. 
non-GC firms) did not have a GC on the top management team. 
 The dependent variable in the first stage model is the GC indicator variable.  The 
determinants begin with a series of variables to capture the firm’s litigation risk from 
Kim and Skinner (2012).  These include firm size (AT), sales growth (ΔREV), stock 
returns (MARET), stock return skewness (SKEWRET), stock return volatility (SDRET), 
and share volume (TURN). 27   I then include a series of corporate governance 
characteristics including the G-Index (GINDEX) (Gompers et al., 2003),28 the percentage 
of shares owned by insiders (INSIDEOWN), and the percentage of shares owned by 
institutional investors (INSTOWN).  I also include firm age (FIRMAGE), an indicator 
variable that captures CEO turnover (CEOTURN), an indicator variable that captures 
whether the Chief Risk Officer is a member of the top management team (CRO), and an 
indicator variable that captures whether the firm was previously sued during the sample 
period (HISTSUIT).  Finally, I include industry fixed effects using the Fama-French 48 
industry classifications.  All variables are lagged one year to precede the decision to 
include the GC on the top management team (except FIRMAGE, CRO, and the industry 
fixed effects). 
 The first stage results are reported in Table 10 Panel A.  Stock volatility, firm age, 
and institutional ownership are positively associated with having a GC on top 
                                                
27 I exclude the indicator variable FPS for litigious industries because I include industry fixed 
effects in the model. 
28 Because GINDEX is missing for many observations I utilize zero-order regression to avoid 
sample attrition. Specifically, missing GINDEX observations are set to zero and I include an 
indicator variable (GDUM) equal to one if GINDEX is missing, zero otherwise (Greene, 1993; 
Hopkins et al., 2015). 
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management.  The indicator variables for CEO turnover, a historical lawsuit, and for 
firms with a Chief Risk Officer on top management are also positively associated with 
having a GC on top management.  Sales growth, stock return skewness, the G-Index, and 
inside share ownership are all negatively associated with having a GC on top 
management. 
The second stage results are reported in Table 10 Panels B-F. Table 10 Panel B 
reports the firm’s earnings management activities.  The coefficient on the GC indicator 
variable is insignificant in the discretionary accrual specification (β=-0.001, p>0.10), 
though it remains positive and significant in both of the real earnings management 
specifications (β=0.020, p<0.01; β=0.033, p<0.01).  Table 10 Panel C reports the firm’s 
preference for real or accrual earnings management activities.  The GC firms are not 
more likely to use accrual earnings management tactics to reach the earnings targets as 
evidenced by the insignificant coefficient on the GC indicator variable in the DACC 
specification (β=-0.048, p>0.10), though the GC firms are more likely to use real 
earnings management tactics as evidenced by the positive coefficient on the GC indicator 
variable in both of the REM1 specifications (β=0.324, p<0.05; β=0.267, p<0.10).  
However, the coefficient on GC is insignificant in both of the REM2 specifications 
(β=0.173, p>0.10; β=0.214, p>0.10).  
 Table 10 Panel D reports the asymmetric timeliness of earnings results.  The 
coefficient on the D*MARET*GC interaction is insignificant when the control variables 
are excluded (β=0.047, p>0.10) and when the control variables are included (β=0.038, 
p>0.10).  Table 10 Panel E reports the detection risk results.  The coefficient on the 
interaction between the earnings management proxy and the GC indicator variable is 
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negative and significant in all three specifications: DACC*GC (β=-5.522, p<0.05), 
REM1*GC (β=-2.491, p<0.05), REM2*GC (β=-1.405, p<0.10).  Finally, Table 10 Panel 
F reports the severity of penalties results.  The GC firms are less likely to be sued 
following restatement announcements as evidenced by the negative and significant 
coefficient on the GC indicator when all lawsuits are included (β=-0.595, p<0.05) and 
when only settled lawsuits are included (β=-0.707, p<0.10).  Similar to the earlier results, 
the coefficient on the GC indicator variable is insignificant when only dismissed lawsuits 
are included (β=-0.460, p>0.10).29 
 
4.7 Additional Analyses 
4.7.1 GCs and Corporate Risk 
Having established the GC’s effect on the firm’s accounting practices, I now turn 
to the GC’s effect on the firm’s overall corporate risk and the market’s assessment of the 
GC’s contribution to the firm.  Corporate risk, as reflected in performance volatility, 
increases the likelihood of a large stock price decline and a subsequent lawsuit (Kim and 
Skinner, 2012).  Further, managers owe a fiduciary duty to shareholders to act in their 
interests.  The fiduciary duty has become especially relevant to GCs in recent years due 
to Section 307 of SOX.  Section 307 requires the firm’s attorneys to report securities law 
violations or breaches of fiduciary duty “up-the-ladder” to the chief legal officer, CEO, 
audit committee, and/or board of directors (U.S. Congress, 2002).  Risky corporate 
activities can raise questions about how well managers’ have fulfilled their fiduciary 
                                                
29 I exclude the specification without pending lawsuits because the propensity-matched sample 
does not include any observations with a subsequent pending lawsuit.  Therefore, the results are 
identical to those in column 1. 
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duties.  In fact, by March 2005 the SEC had already filed enforcement actions against 76 
attorneys under SOX Section 307 (Hogan and Hartson LLP, 2005; Lowenfels et al., 
2006; Choudhary et al., 2013a). 
 In their role as business advisors, GCs can affect their firms’ corporate risk by 
influencing managers’ choice of projects to invest in as well as financial decisions such 
as the degree of leverage the firm carries.  Following Bova et al. (2015), I focus on 
aggregate measures of corporate risk to capture the GC’s net effect on corporate risk.30 
The model is as follows. 
 
CORPRISKi,t+1 = β0 + β1(GCi,t) + Σβi(Controls) + εi,t (5) 
 
CORPRISK represents the corporate risk variable of interest in the respective 
firm-year.  SDRETD is the standard deviation of daily returns over the fiscal year.  
SDRETD_ID is the idiosyncratic component of the standard deviation of daily returns.  
SDROA is the standard deviation of seasonally adjusted quarterly return on assets over 
the years t+1 to t+4.  CAPEX is capital expenditures scaled by lagged net property, plant, 
and equipment.  RD is research and development expenditures scaled by lagged sales.  
All other variables were previously defined.  A negative (positive) coefficient on the GC 
indicator variable suggests the GC is associated with lower (higher) corporate risk. 
Table 11 reports the results of the GC’s effect on the firm’s corporate risk.  The 
coefficient on the GC indicator variable is negative and significant in columns 1 and 2, 
where the dependent variable is daily stock return volatility and the idiosyncratic 
component of daily stock return volatility, respectively (β=-0.124, p<0.01; β=-0.109, 
                                                
30 Though understanding the exact channel by which the GC affects corporate risk is interesting in 
its own right, this is beyond the scope of the current study and thus left for future research. 
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p<0.01).  The coefficient on GC is insignificant in column 3, where the dependent 
variable is ROA volatility (β=0.013, p>0.10).  The coefficient on the GC indicator 
variable is negative and significant in columns 4 and 5, where the dependent variable is 
CAPEX and RD, respectively (β=-0.029, p<0.01; β=-0.009, p<0.01).  Collectively, these 
results suggest that GC firms are associated with lower overall corporate risk. 
 
4.7.2 GCs and Firm Value 
 To assess the GC’s value to the firm, I examine the firm’s stock market 
performance during years in which the GC is appointed to a top management position.  
Each firm-year in which the GC indicator variable equals 0 in year t-1 and equals 1 in 
year t is matched to a firm-year in which the GC indicator variable equals 0 in year t-1 
and year t.  The firm-years are also matched using lagged firm size (MVE) and litigation 
risk (LITRISK) to control for the likelihood that the GC is appointed to top management.  
I then compare the cumulative market-adjusted returns across the two groups via the 
following model. 
 
MARETt = β0 + β1(GCAPPTt) + Σβi(Controls) + εt (6) 
 
GCAPPT is an indicator variable equal to one if the GC was promoted to the top 
five highest paid executives in the current fiscal year, zero otherwise.  The returns are 
cumulated from the fourth month of the appointment fiscal year to the third month of the 
following fiscal year, inclusive.  A positive coefficient on GCAPPT suggests that the 
market values the GC’s contribution to the firm. 
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Table 12 reports the results. GCAPPT captures the differential stock market 
performance between the two groups after controlling for several determinants of stock 
market performance.  The coefficient on GCAPPT is positive and significant in column 1 
(β=0.031, p<0.01), indicating that the GC appointment years outperform non-
appointment years with similar characteristics.  In column 2 the sample is restricted to the 
first GC appointment year for each firm over the sample period.  This helps to alleviate 
concerns that the results are capturing GCs who fluctuate between being in and out of the 
top five highest paid executives from year to year (i.e. 6th in 2005, 5th in 2006, 6th in 2007, 
and so on).  The coefficient on GCAPPT remains positive and significant (β=0.052, 
p<0.05), and the magnitude of the coefficient increases by nearly 70%.  Overall, these 




Chapter 5: Conclusion 
 This study examines the impact of corporate general counsels on the legal risk 
associated with the firm’s accounting practices.  I argue that the GC can affect the firm’s 
legal risk via three channels: (1) the riskiness of the firm’s accounting practices, (2) the 
likelihood that these activities are detected by outsiders, and (3) the sanctions imposed if 
these activities are detected.   
I test the riskiness of the firm’s activities via the firm’s earnings management 
activities and the degree of accounting conservatism exhibited by the firm.  I find that 
GCs reduce legal risk by encouraging the use of a less risky form of earnings 
management, real earnings management, relative to accruals management.  I also find 
that GC firms accelerate the recognition of losses (i.e. report more conservatively), which 
is also associated with reduced legal risk.  I examine the GC’s effect on detection risk by 
testing whether the firm’s aggressive accounting practices are detected by external parties.  
I find that, in the presence of a GC, the firm’s earnings management activities are less 
likely to be targeted by the SEC via an AAER enforcement action.  I examine the GC’s 
effect on the sanctions imposed upon detection by testing the litigation outcomes 
resulting from financial restatements.  I find that GC firms are less likely to be sued 
following a restatement announcement.  Further, when sued, the GC firms’ lawsuits are 
more likely to be dismissed and the settlement amounts are lower.  In aggregate, these 
results suggest that the GC reduces the firm’s legal risk via all three channels analyzed – 
the firm’s risky activities, its detection risk, and the sanctions imposed upon detection. 
The analyses culminate with an examination of the GC’s impact on overall 
corporate risk and the market’s assessment of the GC’s contribution to the firm.  I find 
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that GC firms are associated with lower corporate risk as reflected in the volatility of the 
firm’s stock returns and the firm’s investing behavior.  I also find that the market 
responds favorably to GC appointments to top management, suggesting that the market 
sees value in the GC position. 
By contributing to a greater understanding of the GC’s role in financial reporting, 
this study adds to the burgeoning literature on the role of managers in financial reporting.  
While prior studies have traditionally focused on CEOs and CFOs (Cheng and Warfield, 
2005; Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006; Jiang et al., 2010), GCs have only recently been 
acknowledged as a key contributor (Kwak et al., 2012; Choudhary et al., 2013a, 2013b; 
Goh et al., 2014; Hopkins et al., 2015).  I provide evidence that GCs play a more 
expansive role in the firm’s accounting choices than previously acknowledged.  More 
importantly, I contribute to this literature by documenting and providing evidence on the 









GC Indicator variable equal to one if the general counsel is among the top five paid executives 
in the respective firm-year, zero otherwise.  I identify whether the GC is on the top 
management team via the annual job titles reported by Execucomp.  I search the annual 
titles of all available executive-firm-years for the words “counsel”, “law”, “legal”, and 
similar variants to identify executives who are general counsel.  I manually review the 
executives’ titles that are captured by this search and exclude the titles that do not refer to 
legal experts such as tax counsel, investment counsel, etc.  I also manually review the job 
titles that are not captured via the search and code these titles accordingly. 
GCANN Indicator variable equal to one if the general counsel is among the top five paid executives 
at the time of the restatement announcement, zero otherwise. 
GCAPPT Indicator variable equal to one if the general counsel is appointed to the top five paid 
executives in the current fiscal year, zero otherwise. 
GCINDADJ GC less the industry average of GC for the corresponding industry-year. Industry is defined 
by the Fama-French 48 industry classifications. 
Outcome Variables 
AAER Indicator variable equal to one if the fiscal year is associated with an AAER investigation, 
zero otherwise. AAER data are obtained from the Center for Financial Reporting and 
Management at the University of California, Berkeley (Dechow et al., 2011). 
CAPEX Capital expenditures scaled by lagged net PP&E. 
DACC Discretionary accruals measured as the residual from the following modified Jones (1991) 
model (Dechow et al., 1995). 
 
TAi,t = β0 + β11/ATi,t-1 + β2ΔREVi,t + β3PPEi,t + εi,t 
 
where TA is total accruals for firm i in year t. Total accruals are calculated as the difference 
between income before extraordinary items and operating cash flows. AT is total assets, 
ΔREV is the change in total revenue, PPE is gross property, plant, and equipment. ΔREV 
and PPE are scaled by beginning assets. The model is estimated for each industry-year with 
at least 10 observations. Industry is defined by 2-digit SIC code. The variable is set to 
missing for financial firms (SIC 6000-6999) and utility firms (SIC 4900-4999). 
DISMISS Indicator variable equal to one if the class action lawsuit is dismissed, zero otherwise. 
MARET Market-adjusted cumulative monthly returns over the year. Market return is the value-
weighted CRSP index. Returns are cumulated from the fourth month of the fiscal year to 
the third month of the following fiscal year, inclusive. 
RD Research and development expenditures scaled by lagged sales. 
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REM1 Real earnings management proxy 1, which equals the sum of abnormal discretionary 
expenses multiplied by negative one and abnormal production costs, calculated as in 
Roychowdhury (2006). Abnormal discretionary expenses are calculated as the residual 
from the following model. 
 
DISEXPi,t = β0 + β11/ATi,t-1 + β2REVi,t-1+ εi,t 
 
where DISEXP is discretionary expenses for firm i in year t. Discretionary expenses are 
calculated as the sum of R&D expenses, advertising expenses, and SG&A expenses. AT is 
total assets and REV is total revenue. DISEXP and REV are scaled by beginning assets. 
The model is estimated for each industry-year with at least 10 observations. Industry is 
defined by 2-digit SIC code. The variable is set to missing for financial firms (SIC 6000-
6999) and utility firms (SIC 4900-4999). 
 
Abnormal production costs are calculated as the residual from the following model. 
 
PRODi,t = β0 + β11/ATi,t-1 + β2REVi,t + β3ΔREVi,t + β4ΔREVi,t-1 + εi,t 
 
where PRODi,t is production costs for firm i in year t. Production costs are the sum of 
COGS and the change in inventory. PROD is scaled by lagged assets. The model is 
estimated for each industry-year with at least 10 observations. Industry is defined by 2-digit 
SIC code. The variable is set to missing for financial firms (SIC 6000-6999) and utility 
firms (SIC 4900-4999). 
REM2 Real earnings management proxy 2, which equals the sum of abnormal discretionary 
expenses and abnormal cash flows, both multiplied by negative one, calculated as in 
Roychowdhury (2006). Abnormal cash flows are calculated as the residual from the 
following model. 
 
CFOi,t = β0 + β11/ATi,t-1 + β2REVi,t + β3ΔREVi,t + εi,t 
 
where CFOi,t is cash flows from operations for firm i in year t. CFO is scaled by lagged 
assets. All other variables are defined in REM1. The model is estimated for each industry-
year with at least 10 observations. Industry is defined by 2-digit SIC code. The variable is 
set to missing for financial firms (SIC 6000-6999) and utility firms (SIC 4900-4999). 
SDRETD Standard deviation of daily returns over the fiscal year. 
SDRETD_ID Idiosyncratic volatility calculated as the standard deviation of the residuals from the market 
model wherein the firm’s daily returns are regressed on the value-weighted CRSP index 
daily returns over the fiscal year. 
SDROA Standard deviation of seasonally-adjusted quarterly ROA over years t+1 to t+4. Quarterly 
ROA is income before extraordinary items scaled by average assets. Quarterly ROA is 
seasonally-adjusted as the difference between current quarter ROA and ROA in the same 
quarter of the previous fiscal year. 
SETTLEMENT Dollar value of the class action lawsuit settlement amount in millions. 
SUED Indicator variable equal to one if a class action lawsuit was filed against the firm within two 
years of the restatement announcement, zero otherwise. I exclude lawsuits filed within 30 
days of the restatement announcement because these are likely due to events that occurred 
prior to the restatement announcement. 
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Control Variables 
ACIND Indicator variable equal to one if the firm’s audit committee is comprised of all independent 
directors, zero otherwise. 
AUDTEN Natural log of auditor tenure in years. 
BIG4 Indicator variable equal to one if the firm’s auditor is a big four accounting firm (big 5/6 for 
earlier years), zero otherwise. 
BOARDIND Percentage of board members that are independent. 
BOARDSIZE Natural log of the number of directors on the board. 
CEODUAL Indicator variable equal to one if the CEO is also chairman of the board, zero otherwise. 
CFO Cash flows from operations scaled by lagged assets. 
CYCLE Natural log of the firm’s operating cycle defined as the sum of days’ accounts receivable 
and days’ inventory. Days’ AR is calculated as average AR scaled by sales and divided by 
360. Days’ inventory is calculated as average inventory scaled by COGS and divided by 
360.  
D Indicator variable equal to one if MARET is negative, zero otherwise. 
FPS Indicator variable equal to one for high litigation risk industries, zero otherwise (SIC 2833-
2836, 3570-3577, 3600-3674, 5200-5961, 7370-7374, 8731-8734). 
INSTOWN Percentage of institutional ownership. 
ISSUE Indicator variable equal to one if the sum of issued securities (sstk or dltis) during the fiscal 
year is greater than ten percent of total assets, zero otherwise (Badolato et al., 2015). 
LEV Current debt plus long-term debt scaled by the market value of equity. 
LITRISK Litigation risk measured as the predicted value from the following model (Kim and 
Skinner, 2012). 
 
SUITi,t = β0 + β1FPSi,t + β2LOGATi,t-1 + β3ΔREVi,t-1 + β4RETi,t-1 + β5SKEWRETi,t-1 + 
β6SDRETi,t-1 + β7TURNi,t-1 + εi,t 
 
where SUIT is an indicator variable equal to one if a class action lawsuit is filed against 
firm i in year t, zero otherwise. FPS is an indicator variable equal to one for high litigation 
risk industries, zero otherwise (SIC 2833-2836, 3570-3577, 3600-3674, 5200-5961, 7370-
7374, 8731-8734), LOGAT is the natural log of total assets, ΔREV is the change in revenue 
scaled by lagged assets, MARET is the market-adjusted cumulative monthly return over the 
fiscal year, SKEWRET is the skewness in monthly returns over the fiscal year, SDRET is 
the standard deviation in monthly returns over the fiscal year, and TURN is trading volume 
over the fiscal year scaled by beginning shares outstanding.  The model is estimated once 
for the full sample with available data. 
LOSS Indicator variable equal to one if net income is negative, zero otherwise. 
MKTSH Firm revenue scaled by industry revenue. Industry is defined by the Fama-French 48 
industry classifications. 
MTB Market value of equity scaled by the book value of equity. 
MTR Marginal tax rates provided by Professor John Graham at the link below. Missing values 
are calculated as in Graham and Mills (2008). 
https://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/~jgraham/taxform.html 
MVE Natural log of the market value of equity. 
NOA Net operating assets calculated as shareholders’ equity less cash and marketable securities 
plus current and long-term debt scaled by lagged sales. 
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NOL Net operating loss indicator variable equal to one if the firm has a positive net operating 
loss carry-forward, zero otherwise. 
REVENUE Indicator variable equal to one if revenue was restated, zero otherwise. 
ROE Income before extraordinary items scaled by lagged market value of equity. 
SDRET Standard deviation of monthly stock returns over the fiscal year. 
TURN Trading volume over the fiscal year scaled by beginning shares outstanding. 
ZSCORE Indicator variable equal to one if the Z-Score is above the sample median, zero otherwise. 
Z-score is calculated as follows (Altman 1968, 2000).  
3.3*(earnings before interest and taxes / total assets) + 1.0*(total revenue / total assets) + 
1.4*(retained earnings / total assets) + 1.2*(current assets - current liabilities / total assets) 
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 Sample Description 
        
 
Panel A: GC Firms by Year 
 
 
Year GC Firms Non-GC Firms Total Firms 
 
 
1992 10 2% 395 98% 405 
 
 
1993 213 18% 954 82% 1,167 
 
 
1994 313 20% 1,237 80% 1,550 
 
 
1995 347 22% 1,253 78% 1,600 
 
 
1996 389 24% 1,256 76% 1,645 
 
 
1997 396 24% 1,276 76% 1,672 
 
 
1998 403 23% 1,325 77% 1,728 
 
 
1999 457 25% 1,350 75% 1,807 
 
 
2000 492 27% 1,298 73% 1,790 
 
 
2001 488 29% 1,178 71% 1,666 
 
 
2002 512 31% 1,158 69% 1,670 
 
 
2003 544 31% 1,193 69% 1,737 
 
 
2004 554 32% 1,197 68% 1,751 
 
 
2005 557 32% 1,191 68% 1,748 
 
 
2006 586 31% 1,279 69% 1,865 
 
 
2007 636 30% 1,480 70% 2,116 
 
 
2008 646 32% 1,392 68% 2,038 
 
 
2009 686 34% 1,303 66% 1,989 
 
 
2010 751 39% 1,191 61% 1,942 
 
 
2011 719 38% 1,161 62% 1,880 
 
 
2012 712 39% 1,105 61% 1,817 
 
 
2013 272 43% 365 57% 637 
 
 





Panel B: GC Firms by Industry 
 
 
Industry % GC Firms   Industry % GC Firms 
 
 

















Precious Metals 34% 
 
 
Electronic Equipment 18% 
 










Construction Materials 36% 
 
 
Business Supplies 22% 
 










Ship & Railroad Equipment 37% 
 
 










Consumer Goods 26% 
 
Electrical Equipment 38% 
 
 







Real Estate 39% 
 
 





Personal Services 27% 
 































   Transportation 33%  Tobacco Products 83%  
This table reports the sample description. Panel A reports the number and percentage of firms with a 
general counsel in top management by fiscal year. Panel B reports the percentage of firm-years with a 






 Descriptive Statistics 
            
 
Panel A: Full Sample 
 
 
              GC=0 GC=1   
 
 






AAER 33,942 0.014 0.117 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.015 0.012 0.043 
 
 
CAPEX 31,891 0.275 0.250 0.121 0.201 0.336 0.286 0.248 0.000 
 
 
DACC 28,116 0.030 0.106 -0.022 0.027 0.084 0.027 0.038 0.000 
 
 
MARET 34,519 0.055 0.474 -0.218 -0.010 0.221 0.051 0.064 0.022 
 
 
RD 33,131 0.044 0.106 0.000 0.000 0.032 0.047 0.037 0.000 
 
 
REM1 28,252 0.012 0.259 -0.112 0.022 0.154 0.001 0.039 0.000 
 
 
REM2 28,012 0.065 0.402 -0.128 0.069 0.286 0.049 0.104 0.000 
 
 
SDRETD 33,403 2.716 1.443 1.705 2.349 3.313 2.752 2.635 0.000 
 
 
SDRETD_ID 32,775 2.352 1.312 1.430 2.017 2.895 2.395 2.250 0.000 
 
 
SDROA 28,662 2.553 3.809 0.519 1.157 2.774 2.553 2.565 0.815 
 





ACIND 22,032 0.841 0.365 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.837 0.851 0.009 
 
 
AUDTEN 34,990 2.369 0.780 1.792 2.398 3.045 2.351 2.413 0.000 
 
 
BIG4 34,990 0.944 0.230 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.938 0.957 0.000 
 
 
BOARDIND 22,032 0.703 0.165 0.600 0.727 0.833 0.691 0.731 0.000 
 
 
BOARDSIZE 22,032 2.312 0.249 2.079 2.303 2.485 2.311 2.316 0.182 
 
 
CEODUAL 22,032 0.702 0.458 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.696 0.714 0.007 
 
 
CFO 35,056 0.104 0.103 0.048 0.096 0.155 0.106 0.099 0.000 
 
 
CYCLE 35,556 4.813 1.147 4.229 4.688 5.146 4.874 4.670 0.000 
 
 
INSTOWN 35,367 0.638 0.246 0.494 0.676 0.824 0.629 0.662 0.000 
 
 
LEV 35,681 0.650 1.489 0.051 0.229 0.613 0.614 0.735 0.000 
 
 
LITRISK 29,802 0.032 0.032 0.014 0.023 0.039 0.033 0.031 0.000 
 
 
LOSS 36,200 0.171 0.377 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.169 0.179 0.014 
 
 
MKTSHR 36,196 0.013 0.028 0.001 0.003 0.010 0.013 0.013 0.014 
 
 
MTB 35,830 2.894 3.118 1.382 2.104 3.387 2.969 2.714 0.000 
 
 
MTR 36,198 0.240 0.140 0.060 0.331 0.350 0.247 0.225 0.000 
 
 
MVE 35,834 7.339 1.632 6.253 7.256 8.380 7.308 7.415 0.000 
 
 
NOA 35,906 1.240 1.723 0.379 0.675 1.310 1.231 1.264 0.101 
 
 
NOL 36,246 0.329 0.470 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.310 0.375 0.000 
 
 
ROE 35,495 0.022 0.164 0.023 0.054 0.078 0.024 0.015 0.000 
 
 
SDRET 34,880 0.112 0.066 0.066 0.095 0.138 0.113 0.110 0.000 
 
 





Panel B: Restatement Sample 
 
 
              GC=0 GC=1   
 
 






SUED 1,470 0.089 0.285 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.105 0.059 0.004 
 
 
DISMISS 131 0.397 0.491 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.353 0.552 0.054 
 
 
SETTLEMENT 64 104.278 417.734 7.025 15.525 38.046 118.780 34.401 0.546 
 





BIG4 1,470 0.936 0.245 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.927 0.953 0.057 
 
 
FPS 1,470 0.335 0.472 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.376 0.255 0.000 
 
 
ISSUE 1,465 0.329 0.470 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.309 0.366 0.028 
 
 
MVE 1,431 7.100 1.604 6.111 6.984 8.149 7.104 7.114 0.919 
 
 
REVENUE 1,470 0.210 0.408 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.207 0.216 0.685 
 
 
ROE 1,415 -0.025 0.303 -0.002 0.038 0.070 -0.017 -0.037 0.239 
 
 
SDRET 1,358 0.126 0.079 0.073 0.104 0.147 0.126 0.126 0.970 
  TURN 1,358 2.634 2.183 1.135 1.926 3.282 2.661 2.590 0.572  
This table reports descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent variables. Panel A reports descriptive statistics for the 






Panel A: Full Sample 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
(1) GC – 
               (2) AAER -0.01 – 
              (3) CAPEX -0.07 0.03 – 
             (4) DACC 0.05 0.02 -0.01 – 
            (5) MARET 0.01 0.00 0.20 0.04 – 
           (6) RD -0.04 0.03 0.24 -0.01 0.05 – 
          (7) REM1 0.07 0.01 -0.23 0.21 -0.09 -0.19 – 
         (8) REM2 0.06 0.03 -0.14 0.16 -0.04 -0.13 0.92 – 
        (9) SDRETD -0.04 0.04 0.18 -0.05 -0.01 0.27 -0.05 -0.03 – 
       (10) SDRETD_ID -0.05 0.05 0.19 -0.07 -0.04 0.28 -0.05 -0.04 0.97 – 
      (11) SDROA 0.00 0.03 0.14 -0.10 -0.05 0.40 -0.05 -0.05 0.45 0.48 – 
     (12) ACIND 0.02 -0.07 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.07 -0.11 0.00 – 
    (13) AUDTEN 0.04 -0.01 -0.11 0.02 -0.02 -0.05 0.06 0.04 -0.13 -0.15 -0.10 0.01 – 
   (14) BIG4 0.04 0.01 -0.04 -0.02 0.00 -0.03 0.01 0.02 -0.07 -0.07 -0.08 -0.03 0.22 – 
  (15) BOARDIND 0.11 -0.07 -0.07 0.05 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.14 -0.20 -0.03 0.41 0.05 0.04 – 
 (16) BOARDSIZE 0.01 0.02 -0.22 0.03 -0.03 -0.23 0.07 0.05 -0.27 -0.29 -0.22 -0.05 0.16 0.14 0.10 – 
(17) CEODUAL 0.02 0.04 -0.07 0.02 0.00 -0.06 0.02 0.01 -0.03 -0.02 -0.06 -0.09 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.11 
(18) CFO -0.03 -0.01 0.20 -0.17 0.15 -0.15 -0.37 -0.21 -0.15 -0.15 -0.19 -0.01 0.06 0.05 -0.03 -0.09 
(19) CYCLE -0.08 0.01 -0.05 0.07 -0.02 0.03 -0.03 -0.06 -0.04 -0.06 -0.10 -0.01 -0.06 -0.07 0.03 0.22 
(20) INSTOWN 0.06 0.02 0.07 0.06 0.05 -0.01 0.01 0.04 -0.03 -0.07 -0.05 0.11 0.07 0.05 0.22 -0.14 
(21) LEV 0.04 0.01 -0.17 -0.09 -0.11 -0.13 0.12 0.07 0.15 0.15 0.03 -0.04 -0.04 0.00 0.00 0.14 
(22) LITRISK -0.02 0.08 -0.01 -0.08 0.02 0.08 0.03 0.05 0.11 0.06 0.07 0.00 0.02 0.09 0.07 0.15 
(23) LOSS 0.01 0.01 -0.07 -0.25 -0.09 0.24 0.07 0.02 0.38 0.39 0.39 -0.01 -0.06 -0.06 -0.02 -0.12 
(24) MKTSHR 0.01 0.03 -0.12 -0.03 -0.02 -0.09 0.03 0.03 -0.15 -0.16 -0.09 -0.01 0.19 0.09 0.05 0.26 
(25) MTB -0.04 0.04 0.27 0.03 0.19 0.18 -0.24 -0.18 0.06 0.05 0.04 -0.04 0.02 0.04 -0.03 -0.02 
(26) MTR -0.07 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.00 -0.19 -0.05 -0.02 -0.20 -0.19 -0.22 -0.06 0.00 0.04 -0.10 0.12 
(27) MVE 0.03 0.06 -0.03 0.10 0.09 -0.07 -0.06 0.00 -0.36 -0.43 -0.26 0.01 0.20 0.21 0.16 0.45 
(28) NOA 0.01 0.01 -0.03 0.05 -0.01 -0.03 -0.02 0.01 -0.04 -0.07 -0.06 0.00 -0.12 -0.01 -0.01 0.13 
(29) NOL 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.13 0.05 0.05 0.11 0.09 0.15 0.06 0.02 -0.02 0.10 -0.11 
(30) ROE -0.02 -0.01 0.09 0.30 0.11 -0.14 -0.08 -0.03 -0.36 -0.37 -0.34 0.02 0.06 0.07 0.03 0.10 
(31) SDRET -0.02 0.04 0.14 -0.06 0.15 0.27 -0.04 -0.03 0.62 0.62 0.37 -0.09 -0.11 -0.05 -0.13 -0.28 
(32) ZSCORE -0.13 -0.01 0.27 0.06 0.10 0.13 -0.20 -0.15 0.01 0.02 -0.05 -0.01 0.03 -0.02 -0.09 -0.19 
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    (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) (28) (29) (30) (31) 
(17) CEODUAL – 
              (18) CFO -0.01 – 
             (19) CYCLE 0.03 -0.25 – 
            (20) INSTOWN -0.05 0.18 -0.05 – 
           (21) LEV 0.04 -0.24 0.21 -0.11 – 
          (22) LITRISK 0.05 -0.07 0.08 0.03 0.19 – 
         (23) LOSS -0.03 -0.38 -0.02 -0.10 0.24 0.13 – 
        (24) MKTSHR 0.10 0.02 -0.04 0.03 0.05 0.18 -0.06 – 
       (25) MTB 0.02 0.30 -0.09 0.04 -0.20 -0.01 -0.11 0.06 – 
      (26) MTR 0.07 0.19 0.09 -0.08 -0.09 -0.07 -0.38 0.04 0.07 – 
     (27) MVE 0.13 0.23 0.06 0.14 -0.16 0.36 -0.32 0.42 0.26 0.18 – 
    (28) NOA -0.01 -0.17 0.30 -0.25 0.28 0.04 -0.01 -0.08 -0.09 0.05 0.14 – 
   (29) NOL -0.05 -0.05 -0.10 0.16 0.00 0.05 0.15 0.05 -0.02 -0.64 -0.03 -0.09 – 
  (30) ROE 0.02 0.30 0.02 0.11 -0.40 -0.12 -0.64 0.04 0.09 0.27 0.31 0.04 -0.11 – 
 (31) SDRET -0.01 -0.13 -0.06 -0.03 0.15 0.21 0.40 -0.14 0.01 -0.26 -0.37 -0.09 0.13 -0.39 – 
(32) ZSCORE -0.05 0.37 -0.05 0.14 -0.32 -0.08 -0.24 -0.07 0.27 0.15 0.04 -0.26 -0.06 0.19 -0.01 
 
 
Panel B: Restatement Sample 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
(1) GCANN – 
          (2) SUED -0.075 – 
         (3) DISMISS 0.169 – – 
        (4) SETTLEMENT -0.077 – – – 
       (5) BIG4 0.050 0.004 0.142 -0.306 – 
      (6) FPS -0.121 0.031 -0.124 0.105 -0.073 – 
     (7) ISSUE 0.057 0.022 0.039 0.113 -0.048 -0.024 – 
    (8) MVE 0.003 0.164 0.173 0.377 0.236 -0.009 -0.061 – 
   (9) REVENUE 0.011 0.009 -0.132 0.001 0.039 0.058 -0.015 0.024 – 
  (10) ROE -0.031 0.016 -0.118 0.069 0.087 0.011 -0.036 0.334 0.008 – 
 (11) SDRET -0.001 0.026 0.008 -0.187 -0.064 0.138 0.108 -0.389 0.113 -0.377 – 
(12) TURN -0.015 0.101 -0.084 -0.151 -0.054 0.215 0.124 0.003 0.048 -0.147 0.398 
This table reports pairwise correlations for the dependent and independent variables. Panel A reports correlations for the full sample and Panel B reports correlations for the 







 Relation Between General Counsel and Earnings Management 
  
DACCt REM1t REM2t 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 
 
GCt 0.008*** 0.017*** 0.025** 
 
  
(0.001) (0.005) (0.019) 
 
 
MVEt-1 0.002** 0.009** 0.018*** 
 
  
(0.037) (0.019) (0.002) 
 
 
MTBt-1 0.001*** -0.017*** -0.022*** 
 
  
(0.002) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
 
ROEt-1 0.024*** -0.013 0.038 
 
  
(0.001) (0.587) (0.278) 
 
 
LEVt-1 -0.002 0.011*** 0.009 
 
  
(0.280) (0.001) (0.131) 
 
 
MKTSHt-1 -0.155*** -0.055 -0.173 
 
  
(0.000) (0.711) (0.504) 
 
 
ZSCOREt-1 -0.001 -0.068*** -0.079*** 
 
  
(0.563) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
 
INSTOWNt-1 -0.001 -0.007 0.039 
 
  
(0.923) (0.676) (0.227) 
 
 
MTRt 0.042*** -0.026 -0.029 
 
  
(0.000) (0.247) (0.437) 
 
 
BIG4t -0.005 0.001 -0.003 
 
  
(0.391) (0.956) (0.923) 
 
 
AUDTENt 0.002 0.009* 0.007 
 
  
(0.178) (0.091) (0.458) 
 
 
NOAt 0.005*** -0.013*** -0.006 
 
  
(0.003) (0.000) (0.286) 
 
 
CYCLEt 0.010*** -0.012** -0.034*** 
 
  
(0.000) (0.030) (0.001) 
 
 
CONSt -0.075*** 0.042 0.090 
 
  
(0.000) (0.299) (0.204) 
 
      
 
Observations 26,274 26,274 26,274 
  Adjusted R2 0.049 0.090 0.062  
This table reports the regression results of the relation between the presence of general counsel in top 
management and earnings management. All models include year fixed effects. P-values are reported in 
parentheses and are based on robust standard errors clustered by firm and year. ***, **, and * denote 







 Relation Between General Counsel and Accrual vs. Real Earnings Management 
         
 
Panel A: Percentage of Firms with Positive Earnings Management 
 
 
  GCt=0 GCt=1 Difference P-Value Diff-in-Diff P-Value 
 
 
DACCt>0 67.813 70.724 2.911 0.099 
   
 
REM1t>0 50.692 60.965 10.273 0.000 7.363 0.002
 
 
REM2t>0 56.307 63.694 7.387 0.000 4.476 0.065 
  
 
Panel B: Earnings Management Tradeoff Binary Logit and Ordered Logit Specifications 
 
  
DACCt>0 REM1t>0 REM2t>0 REM1_DACCt REM2_DACCt 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
 
GCt 0.068 0.263** 0.167 0.183** 0.085 
 
  
(0.467) (0.014) (0.120) (0.027) (0.308) 
 
 
MVEt-1 0.024 0.079* 0.106** 0.052 0.069* 
 
  
(0.499) (0.050) (0.021) (0.145) (0.075) 
 
 
MTBt-1 0.007 -0.125*** -0.120*** -0.102*** -0.099*** 
 
  
(0.709) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
 
ROEt-1 -0.266 -0.544 0.076 -0.113 0.337 
 
  
(0.474) (0.352) (0.873) (0.800) (0.373) 
 
 
LEVt-1 -0.137** 0.134 0.112 0.172** 0.146** 
 
  
(0.037) (0.289) (0.237) (0.021) (0.013) 
 
 
MKTSHt-1 -4.103** -0.301 -1.725 1.392 0.394 
 
  
(0.013) (0.888) (0.404) (0.461) (0.832) 
 
 
ZSCOREt-1 -0.063 -0.694*** -0.639*** -0.581*** -0.474*** 
 
  
(0.471) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
 
INSTOWNt-1 -0.145 0.672** 0.773*** 0.608*** 0.688*** 
 
  
(0.588) (0.033) (0.009) (0.007) (0.002) 
 
 
MTRt 0.312 -0.268 -0.003 -0.405 -0.169 
 
  
(0.318) (0.490) (0.994) (0.191) (0.567) 
 
 
BIG4t 0.134 0.395* 0.183 0.311 0.117 
 
  
(0.467) (0.076) (0.448) (0.102) (0.562) 
 
 
AUDTENt 0.063 -0.045 -0.075 -0.060 -0.076 
 
  
(0.182) (0.488) (0.215) (0.279) (0.118) 
 
 
NOAt 0.100* -0.001 0.084 -0.033 0.019 
 
  
(0.088) (0.983) (0.153) (0.441) (0.660) 
 
 
CYCLEt 0.246*** -0.094 -0.209*** -0.162*** -0.255*** 
 
  
(0.001) (0.181) (0.005) (0.005) (0.000) 
 
 
CONSt -1.963*** -0.184 0.332 
   
  
(0.000) (0.711) (0.495) 
   
        
 
Observations 3,380 3,380 3,380 3,380 3,380 
  Pseudo R2 0.0376 0.0790 0.0725 0.0425 0.0348  
This table reports the earnings management behavior of firms that narrowly meet or beat at least one of three earnings thresholds: 1) 
Positive earnings, 2) Positive earnings growth, or 3) Analysts’ consensus forecast. Narrowly meeting or beating is defined as greater 
than or equal to zero and less than or equal to 2*(IQR)*n-1/3. IQR is the interquartile range of the respective earnings threshold and n 
is the number of observations. Panel A reports the proportion of firm-years with positive values for the corresponding earnings 
management proxy. Panel B columns 1-3 report binary logit regression results and Panel B columns 4-5 report ordered logit regression 
results. All models in Panel B include year fixed effects. P-values are reported in parentheses and are based on robust standard errors 
clustered by firm and year. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Variable 





















  coefficient p-value   coefficient p-value   coefficient p-value 
 
 














































































































































  Adjusted R2 0.114   0.115   0.246  
This table reports the regression results of the relation between the presence of general counsel in top management and the 
asymmetric timeliness of earnings. All models include year fixed effects. P-values are reported in parentheses and are based on 
robust standard errors clustered by firm and year. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 






 Relation Between General Counsel and Detection Risk 
  
AAERt AAERt AAERt AAERt 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
 
GCt -0.195 0.004 -0.102 -0.006 
 
  






   
   
(0.001) 





   
   
(0.001) 



















   
1.331*** 
 





   
-1.163* 
 




MVEt-1 0.416*** 0.418*** 0.420*** 0.410*** 
 
  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
 
MTBt-1 0.031 0.030 0.055*** 0.051*** 
 
  
(0.105) (0.120) (0.005) (0.006) 
 
 
ROEt-1 -0.622 -0.561 -0.495 -0.574 
 
  
(0.477) (0.494) (0.566) (0.501) 
 
 
LEVt-1 0.237** 0.255** 0.220** 0.225** 
 
  
(0.020) (0.013) (0.037) (0.029) 
 
 
ACINDt 0.014 0.013 -0.011 -0.014 
 
  
(0.953) (0.956) (0.961) (0.951) 
 
 
BOARDSIZEt -0.761 -0.724 -0.813 -0.760 
 
  
(0.258) (0.272) (0.236) (0.273) 
 
 
BOARDINDt -1.950*** -1.930*** -1.922*** -1.919*** 
 
  
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
 
 
CEODUALt 0.091 0.094 0.092 0.106 
 
  
(0.746) (0.733) (0.734) (0.698) 
 
 
CONSt -5.164*** -5.340*** -5.271*** -5.380*** 
 
  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
       
 
Observations 13,617 13,617 13,617 13,617 
  Pseudo R2 0.106 0.114 0.122 0.125  
This table reports the regression results of the relation between the presence of general counsel in top 
management and detection risk. All models include year fixed effects. P-values are reported in 
parentheses and are based on robust standard errors clustered by firm and year. ***, **, and * denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Variable definitions are provided 





Relation Between General Counsel and the Severity of Penalties 
       
 
Panel A: Restatement Announcement Returns 
 
 
  GCANNt = 0 GCANNt = 1 Difference P-Value 
 
 
RET(-1,+1) -1.320 -1.798 -0.478 0.331 
 
 
RET(-2,+2) -1.394 -2.051 -0.657 0.231 
 
 
MARET(-1,+1) -1.433 -1.806 -0.373 0.424 
 
 
MARET(-2,+2) -1.421 -2.038 -0.618 0.220 
 
 
ABRET(-1,+1) -1.495 -1.771 -0.275 0.549 
 
 
ABRET(-2,+2) -1.588 -2.140 -0.552 0.276 
  
Panel B: Lawsuit Filings Following Restatement Announcements 
 







 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
GCANNt -0.619*** -0.617*** -0.602** -0.286 -0.884*** 
 
(0.005) (0.008) (0.011) (0.379) (0.008) 
MVEt-1 
 
0.459*** 0.456*** 0.618*** 0.339*** 
  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ROEt-1 
 
-0.426 -0.469 -0.805 0.069 
  
(0.322) (0.275) (0.114) (0.922) 
BIG4t 
 
-0.562 -0.625 0.285 -0.907** 
  
(0.175) (0.132) (0.785) (0.045) 
MARET(-2,+2) 
 
-0.826 -0.940 0.023 -1.595 
  
(0.448) (0.398) (0.989) (0.257) 
FPSt 
 
0.037 -0.016 -0.201 0.114 
  
(0.860) (0.941) (0.544) (0.672) 
ISSUEt-1 
 
0.353* 0.356* 0.551* 0.245 
  
(0.089) (0.093) (0.078) (0.372) 
REVENUEt 
 
-0.028 -0.058 -0.441 0.152 
  
(0.906) (0.816) (0.282) (0.617) 
TURNt-1 
 
0.099** 0.092** 0.045 0.130** 
  
(0.022) (0.039) (0.484) (0.022) 
SDRETt-1 
 
2.395 2.253 4.205** 0.668 
  
(0.109) (0.143) (0.048) (0.750) 
CONSt -2.147*** -5.792*** -5.698*** -8.847*** -5.034*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
      Observations 1,465 1,353 1,347 1,280 1,296 






Panel C: Lawsuit Outcomes 
 
 
  GCANNt = 0 GCANNt = 1 Difference P-Value 
 
 
DISMISS 37.500 57.143 19.643 0.067 
  SETTLEMENT 118.780 34.401 -84.379 0.546  
This table reports the regression results of the relation between the presence of general counsel in top 
management and the severity of penalties. Panel A reports stock market returns surrounding the restatement 
announcement dates. Panel B estimates binary logit specifications indicating whether the firm was targeted by a 
class action lawsuit following the restatement announcement. P-values are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * 
denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Panel C reports the outcomes from the 





Controlling for Industry Effects 
       Panel A: Earnings Management 
 
DACCt REM1t REM2t DACCt REM1t REM2t 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
GCt 0.002 0.017*** 0.025*** 
   
 
(0.323) (0.002) (0.008) 
   GCINDADJt 
   
0.001 0.018*** 0.027*** 
    
(0.426) (0.001) (0.005) 
       Observations 26,274 26,274 26,274 26,274 26,274 26,274 
Adjusted R2 0.126 0.180 0.191 0.126 0.180 0.191 
 
 
Panel B: Accrual vs. Real Earnings Management   
 
DACCt>0 REM1t>0 REM2t>0 REM1_DACCt REM2_DACCt 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
GCt -0.020 0.312*** 0.218** 0.241*** 0.143* 
 
(0.825) (0.002) (0.046) (0.002) (0.064) 
      Observations 3,380 3,378 3,378 3,380 3,380 
Pseudo R2 0.0963 0.150 0.155 0.0694 0.0631 
 
 
DACCt>0 REM1t>0 REM2t>0 REM1_DACCt REM2_DACCt 
  (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
GCINDADJt -0.004 0.322*** 0.238** 0.241*** 0.149* 
 
(0.965) (0.002) (0.031) (0.003) (0.067) 
      Observations 3,380 3,378 3,378 3,380 3,380 




Panel C: Asymmetric Timeliness of Earnings 
 
ROEt ROEt ROEt ROEt 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
















  GCINDADJt 
  
-0.004* -0.001 















   
(0.020) (0.005) 
     Observations 25,862 25,862 25,862 25,862 
Adjusted R2 0.128 0.265 0.127 0.265 
 
 
Panel D: Detection Risk 
 
AAERt AAERt AAERt AAERt AAERt AAERt 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
GCt 0.231 0.124 0.203 
   
 
(0.256) (0.560) (0.358) 
   GCINDADJt 
   
0.269 0.166 0.260 
    





























     
 
(0.001) 
     REM1t*GCt 
 
-1.809** 
    
  
(0.014) 
    REM2t*GCt 
  
-1.132** 
   
   
(0.032) 
   DACCt*GCINDADJt 
   
-5.716*** 
  
    
(0.000) 
  REM1t*GCINDADJt 
    
-2.056*** 
 
     
(0.006) 
 REM2t*GCINDADJt 
     
-1.332** 
      
(0.013) 
       Observations 11,741 11,741 11,741 11,741 11,741 11,741 
Pseudo R2 0.158 0.158 0.159 0.159 0.160 0.160 
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Panel E: Severity of Penalties     
  
Excluding Dismissed Settled 
 
All Suits Pending Suits Suits Suits 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
GCt -0.602** -0.579** -0.178 -0.921*** 
 
(0.014) (0.020) (0.604) (0.009) 
     Observations 1,200 1,194 988 1,100 
Pseudo R2 0.111 0.107 0.134 0.103 
 
  
Excluding Dismissed Settled 
 
All Suits Pending Suits Suits Suits 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
GCINDADJt -0.594** -0.548** -0.175 -0.860** 
 
(0.016) (0.027) (0.611) (0.013) 
     Observations 1,200 1,194 988 1,100 
Pseudo R2 0.111 0.107 0.134 0.102 
This table re-estimates the primary results after also controlling for industry effects. The models with the 
experimental variable GC utilize the corresponding specification from the main table and also include 
industry fixed effects based on the Fama-French 48 industry classifications. The models with the 
experimental variable GCINDADJ utilize the corresponding specification from the main table, but use 
GCINDADJ in place of GC. All models include the corresponding control variables, which are not 
reported for brevity. P-values are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 









 Propensity Matching Procedure 
      
 






  coefficient p-value t-stat 
 
 
ATt-1 -0.009 (0.438) -0.776 
 
 
ΔREVt-1 -0.423*** (0.000) -6.154 
 
 
MARETt-1 0.009 (0.779) 0.280 
 
 
SKEWRETt-1 -0.042* (0.072) -1.800 
 
 
SDRETt-1 0.710** (0.012) 2.501 
 
 
TURNt-1 0.001 (0.882) 0.148 
 
 
FIRMAGEt 0.058* (0.055) 1.922 
 
 
GINDEXt-1 -2.157*** (0.000) -11.604 
 
 
GDUMt-1 -1.059*** (0.000) -8.996 
 
 
INSIDEOWNt-1 -1.418*** (0.000) -5.827 
 
 
INSTOWNt-1 0.507*** (0.000) 6.958 
 
 
CEOTURNt-1 0.178*** (0.000) 3.910 
 
 
CROt 0.460*** (0.010) 2.593 
 
 
HISTSUITt-1 0.210*** (0.000) 5.308 
 
 
CONSt 0.093 (0.786) 0.271 
 











Panel B: Earnings Management 
 
DACCt REM1t REM2t 
 (1) (2) (3) 
GCt -0.001 0.020*** 0.033*** 
 
(0.698) (0.005) (0.005) 
    Observations 11,494 11,494 11,494 
Adjusted R2 0.036 0.080 0.054 
 
 
Panel C: Accrual vs. Real Earnings Management 
 
DACCt>0 REM1t>0 REM2t>0 REM1_DACCt REM2_DACCt 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
GCt -0.048 0.324** 0.214 0.267* 0.173 
 
(0.708) (0.038) (0.288) (0.052) (0.290) 
      Observations 1,368 1,368 1,368 1,368 1,368 
Pseudo R2 0.0472 0.0807 0.0739 0.0495 0.0405 
 
 
Panel D: Asymmetric Timeliness of Earnings 
 
ROEt ROEt 
 (1) (2) 
GCt -0.004 -0.001 
 
(0.234) (0.716) 
Dt*GCt 0.006 0.003 
 
(0.382) (0.576) 
MARETt*GCt -0.008* -0.009 
 
(0.094) (0.175) 
Dt*MARETt*GCt 0.047 0.038 
 
(0.217) (0.175) 
   Observations 14,476 14,476 





Panel E: Detection Risk 
 
AAERt AAERt AAERt AAERt 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
GCt -0.054 0.228 0.197 0.269 
 























   
(0.033) 
 REM2t 
   
1.791*** 
    
(0.002) 
REM2t*GCt 
   
-1.405* 
    
(0.072) 
     Observations 5,784 5,784 5,784 5,784 
Pseudo R2 0.0825 0.0909 0.106 0.106 
 
 







 (1) (3) (4) 
GCt -0.595** -0.460 -0.707* 
 
(0.038) (0.265) (0.080) 
    Observations 802 769 771 
Pseudo R2 0.110 0.236 0.0975 
This reports the results of the propensity matching procedure. Panel A reports the first-
stage prediction model that estimates the likelihood of having a general counsel on the 
top management team. Panels B-F report the second stage results on the corresponding 
matched sample. All models include the corresponding control variables, which are not 
reported for brevity. P-values are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Variable 





Relation Between General Counsel and Corporate Risk 
  
SDRETDt+1 SDRETD_IDt+1 SDROAt+1,t+4 CAPEXt+1 RDt+1 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
 
GCt -0.124*** -0.109*** 0.013 -0.029*** -0.009*** 
 
  
(0.001) (0.000) (0.893) (0.000) (0.001) 
 
 
MVEt -0.326*** -0.351*** -0.533*** -0.022*** -0.006*** 
 
  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
 
MTBt 0.069*** 0.064*** 0.170*** 0.014*** 0.008*** 
 
  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
 
CFOt -1.407*** -1.242*** -6.134*** 0.311*** -0.271*** 
 
  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
 
LEVt 0.151*** 0.139*** -0.119** -0.016*** -0.015*** 
 
  
(0.001) (0.001) (0.015) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
 
NOLt 0.287*** 0.266*** 0.968*** 0.019*** 0.027*** 
 
  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
 
 
MARETt 0.162 0.101 -0.187 0.096*** 0.005 
 
  
(0.243) (0.337) (0.535) (0.000) (0.538) 
 
 
CONSt 4.182*** 4.308*** 5.798*** 0.308*** 0.084*** 
 
  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
        
 
Observations 24,991 24,991 24,991 24,991 24,991 
  Adjusted R2 0.445 0.448 0.114 0.165 0.132  
This table reports the regression results of the relation between the presence of general counsel in top management and corporate 
risk. All models include year fixed effects. P-values are reported in parentheses and are based on robust standard errors clustered 
by firm and year. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Variable definitions 










 (1) (2) 
 
 















































     
 
Observations 3,292 1,472 
  Adjusted R2 0.049 0.041  
This table reports the regression results of the stock market reaction to general counsel appointments to 
top management. P-values are reported in parentheses and are based on robust standard errors clustered 
by firm and year in model 1 and by year in model 2. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 
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